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 Abstract 
Human rights are universally recognized. Their enforcement, however, often 
requires the action of particular states. This paper examines private law reme-
dies in tort in several Member states of the European Union to remedy human 
rights violations occurring outside the European Union. It concludes that the 
laws examined are examples of universal jurisdiction and rights and duties of 
private persons under international law, which are two key elements of the 
post-Westphalian state system.  
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Part I: Private Law Protection of Human Rights in various 
Member States of the European Union 
Introduction 
One of the principle remedies in U.S. law for violations of human rights is the 
private law of torts. In fact, torts appear in practice to be the almost exclusive 
remedy to extraterritorial torts which violate human rights in U.S. law.1 This is 
not to say that there is no possibility of penal sanction for human rights viola-
tions in U.S. law. Indeed, there is a torture statute in U.S. federal criminal 
law.2 However, that statute is rarely if ever invoked. Similarly, as in Britain, a 
federal statute outlaws hostage taking under a theory of universal jurisdiction.3 
Again, that statute is only rarely invoked.4  
In Europe, in contrast, the principal remedy for violations of basic human 
right is penal law. But though penal law is the principal remedy for human 
rights violations in Europe tort also plays a role as a remedy for human rights 
violations both overseas and in Europe. Various national laws and even, to a 
lesser extent, European and international law offer limited but significant sec-
ondary private law remedies. Thus, in terms of remedies, European and 
American law are each others’ mirrors. However, both legal systems, though 
using different legal methods, are ultimately seeking to deter and punish simi-
lar fact patterns. This raises the question whether human rights violations are 
best seen as torts, crimes, or both. In fact, the two systems of control can and 
                                                 
* All URLs in footnotes were last visited February 1, 2005. 
1 “[T]here are no significant criminal cases for torture and crimes against humanity in 
the United States despite the legality of such prosecutions. Pursuant to the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” 
Beth van Schaack, In Defence of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human 
Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 Harv. 
Int’l. L. J. 141, 148-149 (Winter, 2001). 
2 The statute states: “Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit 
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if 
death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished 
by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340a (1994).  
3 The Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). (Universal jurisdiction over indi-
viduals who, “whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and threat-
ens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third 
person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act”).  
4 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (jurisdiction over 
accused hijacker proper under Hostage-Taking Act). 
 2
should be mutually reinforcing and complementary. This is because tort reme-
dies have certain advantages over penal remedies: one of tort's principal 
strengths is that it preserves the limited resources of the state’s prosecutor. Tort 
remedies also allow complaints to be made even where such complaints are – 
generally for economic reasons – politically unpopular. At the same time, how-
ever, some wrongful acts deserve not merely economic sanction but also 
deprivation of liberty. Thus there clearly is a place for criminal law in the 
regulation of the most extreme violations of human rights. Both penal and civil 
law have advantages and disadvantages as remedies and should operate in 
conjunction as complements to each other. Both U.S. and European law would 
be improved by a careful consideration of each others’ legal remedies. Such a 
comparison would also improve the state of human rights globally. If ever 
there were a sense and purpose of comparative law and global governance that 
is it. The normative recommendation of this work is that both Europe and Amer-
ica should extend and expand their protection of victims of tortuous violation 
of basic human rights wherever violations of those rights occur. Many victims 
of violations of fundamental human rights live in the third world. Many third 
world countries suffer from corrupt governments and overburdened courts. The 
economic and political inequalities between, say, poor peasants on the one 
hand and wealthy multinational companies and/or governments on the other 
explain why, practically speaking, there is often no remedy for basic violations 
of human rights in the third world. Even if there were no corruption in any 
third world country the fact that systematic violations of human rights can be 
very profitable explains why such rights must be protected in the first world. 
After all, it is the first world which profits from unfair and in fact predatory 
labour practices in the third world. While the U.S. and Europe are already 
making efforts in the direction of global human rights governance the tempo of 
global governance in the interest of human rights will be increased as each of 
the transatlantic partners perceives the benefits of objective comparative legal 
analysis on legal policy making. 
Our analysis of remedies in tort for individuals in European law will first 
consider the law of the Member States then European law. This is because: 
1) The principal remedies are in fact in national law, though complementary 
remedies do exist at the EU as well. 2) The principle of subsidiarity places 
primacy on the laws of the Member States. 3) The law of the European Union 
incorporates the general principles of law of the Member States into its own 
general principles. After we conclude our consideration of the laws of the 
Member States we will then consider the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
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I. The Common Law: Tort Remedies to Human Rights  
Violations in Britain 
Our analysis begins with the common law where we use Britain as the exam-
ple. This methodological approach might at first appear erroneous: There are 
few common law jurisdictions in the EU. Of countries in the EU only Britain, 
Ireland, Malta and perhaps Cyprus can claim to be common law jurisdictions. 
We begin with British law because judicial review of domestic laws against the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) via the British Human Rights 
Act will almost certainly result in the importation of constitutional law doc-
trines from the U.S. to the U.K. where they may in turn find themselves drawn 
on for interpreting community law. 
Just as U.S. law draws on British and other common law jurisdictions as 
persuasive evidence of the common law, so also do British courts draw on U.S. 
as persuasive evidence of British common law. This can be seen clearly just by 
examining the Pinochet cases. For example, in the final Pinochet decision on 
the merits5, the House of Lords cited literally a half dozen U.S. cases as per-
suasive evidence of British law or of how British law should be interpreted.6 
The original Pinochet case was even more generous in its citation of U.S. au-
thority. It is not merely the raw quantity of cases that are cited by the British 
courts that explain the importance of U.S. law for Europe, however. It is also 
the fact that many legal concepts exist in both British and U.S. law and that 
these doctrines are the same or so nearly similar as to explain the extensive ci-
tation of U.S. cases by British courts and lawyers. Similarly, U.S. courts also 
cite British cases as persuasive evidence of what the law is or how it should be 
interpreted.7 This should be hardly surprising as the common law is one legal 
system with common sources and methods of finding and interpreting law. 
                                                 
5 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pi-
nochet Ugarte (No. 3) (24 March, 1999) 1 A.C. 147 (House of Lords, 2000) (hereafter 
Pinochet 3). 
6 The cases cited by the court were: Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corpo-
ration (1989) 109 S. Ct. 683; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky (1985) 603 F. Supp. 1468; 776 F.2d 
571; Jimenez v. Aristeguieta (1962) 311 F.2d 547; Lafontant v. Aristide (1994) 844 F. 
Supp. 128; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 26 F.3d 1166; Saltany v. 
Reagan (1988) 702 F. Supp. 319; Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F. 
Supp. 1108; Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon (1812) 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116; Siderman 
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992) 965 F.2d 699; and United States of America v. 
Noriega (1990) 746 F. Supp. 1506; (1997) 117 F.3d 1206. This is not considering cases 
cited by the litigants nor U.S. cases cited in the other Pinochet cases! 
7 See, e.g. Lawrence v. Texas __ U.S. __ (June 26, 2003), available at:  
<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/26jun20031200/www.supremecourtus.gov/opi
nions/02pdf/02-102.pdf and at: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html>.  
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A. Common Law Doctrines Common to both British and U.S. 
Law in Transnational Law 
1. Immunity 
The British State Immunity Act8 and the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, are one example where even U.S. and British legislation run in parallel. In 
fact, in Pinochet 3, the House of Lords cited an interpretation of the U.S. For-
eign Sovereign Immunities act (enacted in 1976) as evidence of the correct in-
terpretation of the British State Immunity Act of 1978.9 The House of Lords, 
like the U.S. courts, noted the bifurcation of immunity into commercial acts 
(acto jure gestiones) and sovereign acts (acto jure imperii) which is of course 
also the position of international law.10 There are also parallels between the 
Hostage Taking Acts in U.S. and British law. These are far from the only statu-
tory similarities. These similarities track similarities in customary law, consti-
tutional law, sources of law and legal methods and doctrines. Let us examine 
some doctrines of law that illustrate that the British and American law parallel 
each other as they are common law jurisdictions. 
2. Act of State Doctrine 
The Act of State doctrine is essentially the same in British law as in American. 
”[C]ourts will not sit in judgment on the act of a foreign sovereign performed 
within the territories of that sovereign”11 – which is in fact just about word for 
word the same formulation found in U.S. law. The House of Lords in Pinochet 
3 again cites U.S. authority in its elucidation of the meaning of the Act of State 
doctrine, noting that though the two doctrines are distinct in English law, in 
U.S. law they have not always been treated as separate from each other.12 
More significantly, the House of Lords in Pinochet 3 also cites to Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala13 as evidence to justify its rejection of the notion that the Act of 
                                                 
8 UK State Immunities Act, 20th July 1978, available at:  
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID%20Documents/rp04
038.html>. 
9 Pinochet 3, at161. 
10 Id. The court again cites U.S. case law, namely Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 88 I.L.R. 189. 
11 Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1848) 2 H.L.Cas. 1. 
12 Pinochet 3, at 159, citing Kirkpatrick & Co. Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corpora-
tion International (1990) 110 S. Ct. 701; 493 U.S. 400, 405. 
13 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876; 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16111 (2d. Cir., 1980) 
(hereafter Filartiga). The House of Lords also cites Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (1994) 25 
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State doctrine bars proceedings against an individual for acts of torture:14 This 
citation of U.S. authority as persuasive evidence of British law is hardly idio-
syncratic: Citation to U.S. cases occurs extensively in the initial vacated Pino-
chet decision.15 That decision was vacated not due to any substantive error but 
rather due to a procedural error of form: Lord Hoffman’s did not disclose his 
wife's ties to Amnesty International. Substantively, as to the Act of State doc-
trine in English law, Lord Slynn of Hadley noted that “the position is much the 
same as it was in the earlier statements of the United States courts”.16 
3. Comity 
Comity exists in British law just as it does in American law. Again, its mean-
ing is nearly exactly the same: The rules of comity are “the accepted rules of 
mutual conduct as between state and state which each state adopts in relation 
to other states and expects other states to adopt in relation to each other”.17 In 
the context of jurisdiction, “[t]he rules of comity require that the United King-
dom does not assert or assist in the assertion of jurisdiction over the internal 
acts of a foreign state”.18  
4. Forum non conveniens 
Forum non conveniens in British law is, again, very similar to comity in U.S. 
law. In discussing forum non conveniens in British law the House of Lords has 
stated: 
“Where a plaintiff sues a defendant as of right in the English court and the de-
fendant applies to stay the proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens, 
                                                                                                                                                      
F.3d 1467 and Liu v. Republic of China (1989) 892 F.2d 1419 for the proposition that the 
Act of State doctrine will not bar proceedings against individuals for acts of torture and 
that neither doctrine bars inquiry into conduct that violates fundamental human rights. 
14 Pinochet 3, at 159, citing Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. (unre-
ported), 29 July 1998; Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucarera Na-
cional S.A. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 and Letelier v. Republic of Chile (1980) 488 F. 
Supp. 665. Again, note that the British court is citing U.S. law as authority for the le-
gal position of the common law. 
15 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pino-
chet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 61, 85 (House of Lords, 25 Nov. 1998 – judgement vacated for 
rehearing) (hereafter Pinochet 1). 
16 Id. 
17 Buck v. The Attorney General [1965] 1 Ch. 745, [1965] 1 All ER 882 at 770. 
18 Pinochet 3, at 172, citing I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 A.C. 244; Buck v. Attorney-
General [1965] Ch. 745.  
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the principles to be applied by the English court in deciding that application in 
any case not governed by Article 2 of the Brussels Convention are not in 
doubt. They derive from the judgment of Lord Kinnear in Sim v. Robinow 
(1892) 19 R. 665 at 668 where he said: ‘the plea can never be sustained unless 
the court is satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having competent juris-
diction, in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the 
parties and for the ends of justice.’”19  
However, though the court looks to the interest of the plaintiff and defendant 
as well as the ends of justice it does not, unlike U.S. courts, consider public 
interest or public policy.20 Thus, while both the U.S. and British courts engage 
in a balancing of several different factors to determine whether the forum is 
inconvenient, the number of factors in the British formulation of forum non 
conveniens is more limited than is the case in the U.S. 
5. International Law and the Common Law 
Just as in the U.S., customary international law is an integral part of British 
common law. In the final Pinochet decision on the merits of extradition the 
House of Lords held: “The English courts are open to the concept of consulting 
customary international law, as it has evolved over time, as a basis for the 
common law.”21 However, though customary international law is a part of the 
common law Britain, like the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions,22 is a 
dualist legal system as to treaty law. That is, treaties must be incorporated into 
domestic law via an enabling act and are not presumed to have direct domestic 
effect until Parliament (or Congress) passes legislation giving the treaty such 
effect.23 The two legal systems are very similar, at times congruent, and mutu-
                                                 
19 Lubbe and Others and Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] UKHL 41; [2000] 4 All 
ER 268; [2000] WLR 1545 (20th July, 2000), available at: <http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/41.html&query=%22forum+non+ 
conveniens%22&method=all>. 
20 Id. 
21 Pinochet 3, at 161, citing Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria 
[1977] Q.B.529, 551-554, 576-579; I Congreso del Partido [1983] 1 A.C. 244, 261 
and Littrell v. United States of America (No. 2) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 82. 
22 “While Australia, as a common-law country, operates the general dualist approach to 
the domestic effect of international agreements, it does not appear from the judgments 
of the High Court that Australian law replicates that rule with anything quite like the 
constitutional rigour with which it is embodied in article 26 section 6 of the Constitu-
tion”, Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] IESC 11 (Supreme Ct. Eire, 
01 March 2002), para 25. 
23 “Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is 
not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by legis-
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ally referencing in their evolution not only as to their sources of law, hierarchi-
sation of norms, but also as to their inferential and interpretive methods, even 
as to positive statute law. Thus U.S. law has a certain indirect relevance to 
Europe. 
B. Extraterritorial Human Rights Protection in Domestic 
British Law: The Pinochet Cases 
Pinochet, former dictator of Chile, was accused by prosecutors in Spain of 
committing murder and conspiracy to murder as well as of conspiring to com-
mit acts of torture.24 The result of the case may seem unsatisfactory: Pinochet 
was ultimately allowed to retire in comfort due to ill health.25 However, the 
legal issues determined in the case present some hopeful indicators for the fu-
ture of human rights. 
The issue to be decided in Pinochet was whether Pinochet could be extra-
dited for crimes he was accused which took place in Chile, Spain and in other 
countries or whether Pinochet enjoyed immunity as a head of state and thus 
could not be extradited. Thus the central issue in Pinochet, the extent of the 
immunity of a former head of state, was essentially the same issue seen in 
Congo v. Belgium26 and Ariel Sharon’s case. The House of Lords ruled that it 
is clearly27 the case that a former head of state is immune for official acts dur-
                                                                                                                                                      
lation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res inter alios acta from which they 
cannot derive rights and by which they cannot be deprived of rights or subjected to 
obligations; and it is outside the purview of the court not only because it is made in 
the conduct of foreign relations, which are a prerogative of the Crown, but also be-
cause, as a source of rights and obligations, it is irrelevant.” Lord Oliver of Aylmerton 
in J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry (the 'Interna-
tional Tin Council case') [1990] 2 AC 418, 500.  
24 Pinochet 1, at, 85 (House of Lords, 25 Nov. 1998 – judgement vacated for rehearing). 
25 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte The Kingdom of Belgium; 
R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amnesty International Lim-
ited and others, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List) CO/236/2000, 
CO/238/2000, (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (15 February 2000). 
26 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), ICJ 14/II/2002, 2000 I.C.J. 121, 18 (Feb. 14), available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/ 
icobe_ijudgment_toc.htm. 
27 “The immunity of an existing head of state for acts performed in his governmental 
capacity is well recognised.” Pinochet 3, at 173. 
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ing his term of office even after that office has expired.28 Similarly it is almost 
as clear that any criminal acts undertaken for the personal benefit of the head 
of state are not subject to immunity. The court had no difficulty concluding 
that “[a] former head of state cannot have immunity for acts of murder com-
mitted outside his own territory”.29  
The difficult factual question in Pinochet is whether the acts of torture un-
dertaken by Pinochet’s government were official acts of the state or rather 
were personal acts of Pinochet. Pinochet did not personally torture or murder – 
rather he ordered his subordinates to do so for him. Were his motives sadistic? 
Such motives, if present, would be evidence of an act undertaken for personal 
benefit and thus not subject to immunity. This question was considered in the 
initial court decision. That decision was, however, vacated due to a procedural 
impropriety – Lord Hoffmann ought to have excused himself, or at least dis-
close the fact that he30 and his spouse did charitable work for one branch of 
Amnesty International. The question was not as to any improper bias on the 
part of Lord Hoffmann31 but rather as to any appearance of impropriety. The 
court rightly vacated the original judgment because it is “of fundamental im-
portance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and un-
doubtedly be seen to be done.”32 
The difficult legal issue in Pinochet was whether a head of state can be li-
able for acts of torture (and, by extension, other acts in violation of jus cogens) 
after the expiry of his or her term of office. The court reasoned that: the prohi-
bition of torture internationally is jus cogens; that any act in violation of jus 
cogens cannot be immunized33; and that as a consequence no act of torture can 
be immunized. The court reaches this conclusion because: “Certain crimes are 
deemed so odious that no reticence in involving the United Kingdom in the 
internal disputes of foreign states would be shown in relation to them.”34 The 
court thus rejected the argument that head of state immunity would prevent 
prosecution (and thus extradition) for perfectly logical reasons because interna-
                                                 
28 “A former head of state only has immunity with regard to his acts as a head of state 
but not with regard to acts which fall outside his role as head of state.” Id., at 154. 
29 Id. 
30 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte. Pino-
chet [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (House of Lords, 1999) (hereafter Pinochet 2), at 129. 
31 Id., at 132 and 146. 
32 Id., at 135 citing Rex v. Susex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924], 1 K.B. 256, 259. 
33 “International law recognises crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention 
says that no circumstances can be invoked as justification for torture. Therefore it 
cannot be a part of the function of a head of state under international law to commit 
those crimes.” Pinochet 3, at 154. 
34 Id., at 155. 
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tional law does not command a state to accord immunity to a former head of 
state for acts which are prohibited under international law, a fortiori where 
such crimes result in individual liability.35 Simply put: “Neither a former head 
of state nor a current head of state can have immunity from criminal proceed-
ings in respect of acts which constitute crimes under international law.”36 Any 
other view would be illogical and frustrate the purpose of the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT). As we shall see, however, this holding may be in con-
flict with the case of Congo v. Belgium which was later decided by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) (infra). 
Could Pinochet have argued that he should not be extradited on the grounds 
of comity? Probably not. This is because of the international maxim “aut 
dedere aut adjudicare” – states must either extradite or prosecute those who 
commit international crimes.37 This maxim of international customary law has 
direct effect in Britain since customary international law is part of the common 
law.38 Further, immunity should be distinguished from comity. Comity, 
whether in British or U.S. law, is a courtesy extended by one state to another in 
mutual respect and may be withdrawn unilaterally. In contrast, while American 
courts regard head of state immunity of de facto states as a privilege extended 
and not a right (e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic),39 other courts appear to consider state 
immunity as a corollary to sovereign equality and the head of state and diplo-
matic immunities as emanations thereof, and thus a duty. The importance of 
the distinction can be seen in Congo v. Belgium and Pinochet 3. In Congo v. 
Belgium, the ICJ seems to think that the principle of immunity arises out of the 
principle of sovereign equality and thus may be non-derogable. In contrast, in 
Pinochet 3, the rule of non-intervention, which also arises out of the sovereign 
equality of states was not regarded as a jus cogens rule because the duty of 
non-intervention increasingly admits of exceptions.40 That is a logical 
contradiction. 
The view of the court in Pinochet 3 is the better view because it reflects ac-
tual state practice and serves the goal of protecting human rights, a good com-
mon to all persons. States are legal fictions created by people to provide the 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id., at 160. 
37 Pinochet 3, at 154. 
38 Pinochet 3, at 154. 
39 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S 1005 (1996). 
40 “[D]uring the course of the century the treatment by a state of its own citizens, at least 
in certain areas of fundamental importance, has ceased to be regarded as a matter of 
internal affairs. The violation of a norm of jus cogens certainly is not so regarded.” 
Pinochet 3, at 186. 
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citizen with, in Aristotle’s words, the means to the good life.41 Thus where we 
see a conflict between a legal fiction and an actual reprehensible act we should 
be willing to construct the interpretation of the legal fiction as a function of the 
end that it serves – which is another argument that in fact the norm against tor-
ture should be hierarchically superior to the norm of sovereign equality. All 
states are subject to the norm against torture and thus their sovereign equality 
is respected even when that sovereignty is limited by universal obligations of 
all states to each other and/or the international system. 
In Pinochet 3 the court determined that if there were any customary interna-
tional law against conspiracy to commit torture then Pinochet could be crimi-
nally liable for his acts prior to becoming Chile’s head of state. The court also 
ruled that Pinochet could be held liable for actions committed after Chile’s ac-
cession to the Convention Against Torture in 1984 despite the fact that Chile 
had granted amnesty to all state criminals.42 So the difficult issue is whether he 
could also be liable for acts of torture committed while head of state. Of 
course, to determine the extradition issue the court did not actually need to an-
swer this question: having found extraditable crimes prior to and after the term 
of office of Pinochet he would be able to be extradited. The logic of the court, 
however, would compel a conclusion that Pinochet should even be liable for 
those crimes committed during his tenure as head of state because “Interna-
tional law recognizes crimes against humanity and the Torture Convention 
says that no circumstances can be invoked as justification for torture. There-
fore it cannot be a part of the function of a head of state under international law 
to commit those crimes.”43 The court considers it “inconceivable” that the Tor-
ture Convention would somehow exempt those who order mass murder from 
liability.44 The court notes that the universal jurisdiction against torturers is 
consistent with international law stating that: “Article 8(4) [of the Convention 
Against Torture] combined with article 5 amounts to an acknowledgment that 
offences of torture committed in one state can be regarded as having taken 
                                                 
41 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Part II, Para. 9: “When several villages are united in a sin-
gle complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state 
comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence 
for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so 
is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each 
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a 
horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be 
self-sufficing is the end and the best.” available at:   
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.mb.txt> (translation by Benjamin Jowett). 
42 Pinochet 3, at 158. 
43 Id., at 154. 
44 Id. 
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place in the state of which the victim is a national.”45 
The court in Pinochet 3 ultimately ruled that Pinochet would enjoy immu-
nity for acts prior to Chile’s signature of the convention against torture. This is 
not, however, because the court determined the difficult factual issue – 
whether the acts of torture were official or personal acts. Nor did the court de-
termine the difficult legal issue – whether the norm against torture is hierarchi-
cally superior to the norm of sovereign equality. Instead the court determined 
that it did not need to answer these questions because in any event the conspir-
acy, torture, and murders were not at the time of their occurrence violations of 
British law and thus did not meet the standard of double actionability and thus 
were not extraditable offences. However, the court also states: 
“Crimes against humanity are crimes not against a state but against individu-
als and are triable anywhere. Until recently there were almost no international 
tribunals so international crimes could be tried only before a national court. 
Even in 1946 the concept of territoriality of jurisdiction for crimes against 
humanity was not really in issue.”46  
In further justification of its decision, the court notes that Chilean domestic law 
has outlawed torture and that Chile has acceded to the Convention Against 
Torture and thus that the case is not one of a state forcing its laws on another 
but of punishing behaviour which is universally accepted as abhorrent and 
criminal.47 Though the great majority of the claims against Pinochet would not 
have been punishable offences in Britain some were and thus, in theory, Pino-
chet was liable to extradition. In fact, however, he was not due to his advanced 
age and supposed infirmity. 
What are we to make of this decision? The legal conclusions in Pinochet 3 
are, perhaps surprisingly, very favourable to human rights despite the fact that 
Pinochet remains unpunished. Practically speaking though, Pinochet’s case, 
like that of Congo v. Belgium or France v. Khaddafy48 or Sharon’s cases49 or 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id., at 157. 
47 Id., at 159. 
48 Arrêt du 13 mars 2001, no 1414, relatif aux poursuites engagées contre le colonel 
Kadhaffi (hereafter Kadhaffi). 
49 Sharon, Ariel, Yaron, Amos et Autres, Arrêt de la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, 
26/6/2002 available at: <http://www.sabra-shatila.be/documents/arrest020626.pdf>; 
Belgium Supreme Court, 22 February 2001; Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 12 Fevrier, 
2003 unofficial English translation available at:  
<http://www.indictsharon.net/12feb2003dectrans.pdf>; Procureur contre Ariel Sharon 
et Consorts, Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 24/9/2003, available at:  
<http://www.coeicl.de/dokumente/sharon_judgement_240903_juris_cass_a1.pdf>. 
 12
Habré’s case,50 is evidence of the great reluctance of states to subject the lead-
ers of other states to personal liability for crimes against the law of nations. 
However, the efforts made by the dissenting Lords in Pinochet 1 to distinguish 
the “special jurisdiction” of international criminal tribunals as somehow “ex-
ceptional” and thus limit human rights claims to international tribunals ring 
hollow. Lord Slynn in Pinochet 1 states: 
“There is thus no doubt that states have been moving towards the recognition 
of some crimes as those which should not be covered by claims of state or 
head of state or other official or diplomatic immunity when charges are 
brought before international tribunals. 
… 
 It has to be said, however, at this stage of the development of international 
law that some of those statements read as aspirations, as embryonic. It does 
not seem to me that it has been shown that there is any state practice or gen-
eral consensus let alone a widely supported convention that all crimes against 
international law should be justifiable in national courts on the basis of the 
universality of jurisdiction. Nor is there any jus cogens in respect of such 
breaches of international law which require that a claim of state or head of 
state immunity, itself a well-established principle of international law, should 
be overridden. 
That international law crimes should be tried before international tribunals or 
in the perpetrator's own state is one thing; that they should be impleaded with-
out regard to a long-established customary international law rule in the courts 
of other states is another. It is significant that in respect of serious breaches of 
“intransgressible principles of international customary law” when tribunals 
have been set up it is with carefully defined powers and jurisdiction as ac-
corded by the states involved; that the Genocide Convention provides only for 
jurisdiction before an international tribunal or the courts of the state where the 
crime is committed, that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
lays down jurisdiction for crimes in very specific terms but limits its jurisdic-
tion to future acts.”51 
But this ignores one question and several facts: from where do international 
tribunals derive their legitimacy? It also ignores that the norms against geno-
cide, torture and similar international crimes are themselves jus cogens. Thus 
we are faced with a conflict between the norms of non-intervention and sover-
eign equality – both of which increasingly admit of exceptions on the one 
hand, and the norms against genocide, war crimes and torture on the other. Hi-
                                                 
50 Arrêt n' 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000); Ar-
rêt n' 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal (Cour de Cassation, 2001). 
51 Pinochet 1. 
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erarchically each of these norms may at first appear equivalent because they 
are all jus cogens. However, practically it is clear that the doctrine of sovereign 
equality and immunity increasingly admits exceptions and thus logically is not 
in fact jus cogens. In contrast, the norms against genocide, war crimes, and tor-
ture appear to admit of no exception. Finally, morally, there is no contest: in-
ternational crimes are reprehensible, as are the artificial legal constructs which 
shield them. 
In fact international criminal tribunals’ jurisdictional power has always 
been justified not on historical practice but on the fact that the crimes adjudi-
cated are so grievous as to be obviously universally reprehensible and thus 
universally punishable. That is of course a jus naturale argument, though no 
one wants to admit it.52 Asserting that international criminal tribunals some-
how are exceptional and not expressive of valid rules of international law 
(why?) is not only legally questionable it also renders the legitimacy of inter-
national criminal tribunals even more questionable giving rise to accusations 
that such tribunals are nothing other than “victors’ justice”. 
Synthesis 
For all its similarities to U.S. law Britain appears, on first glance, to offer 
fewer remedies for extra-territorial violations of human rights. We have just 
seen, however, that there are at least criminal law remedies in British domestic 
law for overseas violations of jus cogens norms. But there seems to be no 
equivalent to the Alien Tort Statute53 or Torture Victims Protection Act54 in 
British law. Does this mean that alien tort claims cannot be litigated in the 
U.K.? Hardly. There are three ways an alien tort claim could be litigated: first, 
by relying on customary international law; second, by relying on the ordinary 
rules of domestic British tort law; third, based on the Human Rights Act and 
ECHR. The arguments based on the ECHR are considered in the next chapter. 
We will look at the first two arguments in detail here as they are remedies 
within national law. 
                                                 
52 “Where… neither treaty nor customary international law is available or applicable, the 
appeal to higher legal norms must be phrased as an appeal to natural law; and of 
course the conceptual and jurisprudential boundaries between customary jus cogens 
norms and natural law norms are notoriously vague.” Eric Posner, Transitional Justice 
As Ordinary Justice, Harv. L. Rev. 117 HVLR 761, 794 (January, 2004). 
53 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
54 Pub. L. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73. 
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1. Arguments for Torts in the Common Law Based on Crimes in  
Customary International Law 
As to the argument on customary international law it runs as follows: Interna-
tional law recognizes the existence of crimes and torts with appurtenant indi-
vidual liability. Customary international law is an integral part of the common 
law. While customary international law – like custom generally in the common 
law – can be overruled by statute it also requires no enabling act to be en-
forced. International custom does, however, require the ordinary elements of 
custom: practice over a long period of time and opinio juris. For every com-
mon law crime there is a corresponding common law intentional tort. Thus, all 
crimes under customary international law entail corresponding torts in com-
mon law.  
To argue that the above logic is invalid because international law suppos-
edly only binds states ignores long standing state practice. Even in classical 
international law piracy55 and slave trading were crimes and torts in violation 
of the law of nations. International law also recognizes individual tort liability 
in the case of capture of enemy ships during time of war, i.e. the “prize” juris-
diction of admiralty courts.56 In contemporary international law a host of fur-
ther crimes against peace, war crimes, genocidal acts and torture have been 
added to the list of acts which inculpate individuals in tort and crime.57 
The clear trend in the last half century has been toward recognition of rights 
and duties held directly by individuals arising out of international law. Torts 
and crimes in violation of the law of nations almost always benefit from uni-
versal jurisdiction, even universal jurisdiction in absentia, which explains the 
advantage of this theory for plaintiffs. 
Returning then to the argument that international crimes imply correspond-
ing common law torts we can see the logic of this argument through two syllo-
gisms: 
SYLLOGISM 1: 
Major premise:  
There are a number of internationally recognized crimes which are customary 
international law. 
                                                 
55 In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586. 
56 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 67 (facsimile of 1st ed. 
1765-1769, Univ. of Chi. ed., 1979). 
57 Eugene Davidson, The Trials of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty Two Defen-
dants Before the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, 19 (1966). 
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Minor premise: 
Just as in U.S. law, customary international law is an integral part of British 
common law. 
Conclusion: 
Thus, customary international crimes such as piracy, slave trading, and now 
the various war crimes and crimes against humanity are an integral part of the 
common law. 
The logic of the above syllogism seems fairly compelling. Each of the 
premises is true, the syllogism is well formed so the conclusion seems inescap-
able. Let us now consider a second syllogism. The first major premise of the 
second syllogism is the conclusion of the first syllogism: 
SYLLOGISM 2: 
Major premise: 
Customary international crimes such as piracy, slave trading, and now the 
various war crimes and crimes against humanity are an integral part of the 
common law. 
Minor premise: 
For each common law crime there is a corresponding common law intentional 
tort. 
Conclusion: 
Thus, international crimes have corresponding common law intentional torts. 
This argument may seem somewhat surprising unless we understand that 
customary international law is an integral part of the common law. Once we 
recognize that proposition, the implications lead to the conclusion there exists 
a corresponding tort for each of the customary crimes under international law – 
and thus one can make a claim in torts such as torture in the common law even 
without an Alien Tort Statute. 
The deductive argument, that international crimes imply corresponding 
common law torts, can also be proven inductively. The inductive arguments 
look to the practice of other states – which is of course one element of custom-
ary international law. Several other nations also allow private law domestic 
actions for crimes against international law. The best and most well known ex-
amples are the Alien Tort Statute58 and Torture Victim Protection Act.59 We 
                                                 
58 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
59 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) [hereinaf-
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shall later see that in French Civil law as well as in Belgium and Senegal that 
one may combine tort claims with criminal claims via the action civile. Just as 
in the common law, customary international law in French civil law is an inte-
gral part of French law. Thus, even without an alien tort statute it is in theory 
possible to bring a tort claim for a violation of the law of nations in French law 
and those countries which are influenced by French law such as Belgium, 
Senegal, and literally dozens of other countries. In arguing that international 
torts exist or that international crimes give rise to corresponding common law 
torts, the Alien Tort Statute, as well as the writings of Blackstone and Coke, 
are persuasive evidence of the common law, and also as evidence of customary 
international practice in support of the existence of “torts in violation of the 
law of nations”. Substantively, no one can argue against allowing tort compen-
sation in terms of transactional justice: The purpose of justice is to right 
wrongs and law serves justice. 
As to jurisdiction, it is logical to presume that if universal jurisdiction exists 
as to the substantive crime which is the basis of the intentional tort claim then 
it would logically also exist as to the corresponding common law tort. If the 
law permits the greater punishments of imprisonment or execution it also per-
mits a lesser punishment of restitution. 
2. Human Rights Protection through the Ordinary Common Law 
Tort Regime 
Tort claims of individuals for wrongs committed overseas can of course also 
be brought as ordinary torts under British law. Customary common law torts 
such as wrongful imprisonment, battery, conversion, or action on the case 
could be applied to extra-territorial human rights violations, subject, however, 
to the ordinary rules of conflicts of law and without the benefit of universal 
jurisdiction which would exist in the case of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, crimes against peace, piracy and slave trading. 
In sum, human rights violations can be remedied in domestic British law 
through torts in violation of the law of nations, ordinary domestic torts and the 
Human Rights Act which essentially enables ECHR claims to be made in Brit-
ish courts. Remedies under the ordinary domestic tort regime are conditioned, 
as in the United States, by jurisdiction, immunity, and a number of domestic 
prudential concepts. 
                                                                                                                                                      
ter TVPA]. 
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II. Tort Remedies to Human Rights Violations in Civil Code 
Countries 
A. France 
Our examination of civil law countries is divided into two parts: Francophone 
and German civil law countries. We consider French civil law first among civil 
law countries because French law has had a marked influence on the construc-
tion of the European Communities and Union. To this must be added the ex-
tensive influence of the French civil code throughout the world. The French 
legal system is, like the British, a model for that of many other countries, nota-
bly in Africa but also in Québec. 
The French legal system is also on its own terms sufficiently interesting to 
merit extensive consideration. As we have seen, American and British com-
mon law presume that treaties are not self executing and require ratification to 
have domestic effect. This is not the case in France. France is a monist re-
gime.60 Treaties, like international law generally in French law,61 are an inte-
gral part of French law. Treaties are thus presumed to be self executing and 
require no parliamentary enabling act to have domestic effect. In fact, treaty 
law is hierarchically superior to French domestic law.62 French treaties do re-
quire ratification, however.63 Further, though self executing, they do not nec-
essarily have “effet direct” (direct effect). That is, though we may presume that 
a French treaty generally creates individually enforceable rights and duties that 
                                                 
60 « Une claire option moniste paraît a priori résulter du texte de l'article 55 de la Constitu-
tion du 4 octobre 1958, lequel déclare que ‘les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou 
approuvés ont dès leur publication une autorité supérieure à celle des lois’ ». (“A clear 
monist option appears to result a priori from Art. 55 of the French Constitution of October 
4, 1958 which declares that ‘treaties or agreements regularly ratified or approved have on 
publication an authority superior to that of laws’”.) Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit Internatio-
nal Public, Paris 2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 404 (author’s translation). 
61 « le 14° alinéa du Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946 auquel on sait que 
le Préambule de la Constitution de 1958 fait un renvoi exprès, proclame l'attachement 
de la République « aux règles du droit public international » (“Line 14 of the preamble 
of the constitution of October 27, 1946, to which the preamble of the constitution of 
1958 makes direct reference, declares the attachment of the republic ‘to the rules of 
public international law’”). Id. at 408 (author’s translation). 
62 Constitution Française de 1958. 
63 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public, Paris 2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 
404. 
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presumption can be overcome.64 In order to be directly enforceable by an indi-
vidual a treaty in French law must at least be sufficiently precise (neither am-
biguous nor vague) to permit objective decision65 and must also not require on 
its own terms the necessity of creating domestic measures of enforcement.66 
The most conservative view also argues that the intention of the parties must 
have been to create directly enforceable rights on the part of individuals,67 
though one can argue that such is presumptively the case of all legal instru-
ments. 
Our discussion of French law will proceed from the most theoretical ab-
straction and move with greater refinement to actual legal practice. Such a 
method is chosen as it reflects the deductive reasoning so characteristic of 
French law, which reasons from general principles of law embodied in statutes 
to individual cases rulings which, in theory, only concern the actual parties to 
the case. 
1. Customary Law 
Though it is true that French treaties are self executing and thus require no par-
liamentary enabling act to have domestic effect, and as such are an integral 
part of French law68, that is true only of ordinary legislation. The situation is 
less clear as to customary international law.69 In all events, however, if cus-
tomary international law is to be given direct effect within the French domestic 
legal order then the custom must be sufficiently clear so that it can be applied 
objectively.70 That fact can obviate some disputes but not all. What of the case 
where customary law is in fact perfectly clear, say as to the jus cogens norm 
prohibiting torture? There the situation is more complex. The French courts of 
general jurisdiction (Tribunaux de Grand Instance, Cours d’Appel, and Cour 
de Cassation) recognize the superiority of customary international law to 
French legislation.71 For example, where French domestic law would hold a 
                                                 
64 Id., at 398. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Constitution Francaise de 1958, Art. 55.  
69 Moncef Kdhir, Juge Francais et Droit International non Ecrit, 6 Revue du Droit Pu-
blic, Novembre-Décembre 2003, 1581, 1582 (herafter Kdhir).  
70 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public, Paris2002: Éditions Dalloz, page 398. 
71 « Les juridictions judiciaires ne manifestent aucune réticence à invoquer la coutume 
internationale à l'appui de leurs décisions. Dans un arrêt rendu le 6 avril 1826, la Cour 
de cassation se référait déjà à la ‘coutume devenue une maxime incontestable du droit 
des gens’ ou de ‘règle absolue du droit international’. » Kdhir, at 1584. 
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foreign head of state liable for crimes, the international custom of immunity 
for heads of state during their term of office prevented suit of the foreign head 
of state.72 In contrast, disconcertingly,73 the administrative courts, including 
the French constitutional court (Conseil Constitutionnel)74 do not consider cus-
tomary international law when interpreting administrative acts.75 This is also 
true of the general principles of international law which, in French administra-
tive courts, do not over-ride French administrative acts.76 However, the fact is 
French courts of general jurisdiction take the opposite view both to custom and 
to general principles of law. French courts of general jurisdiction regard gen-
eral principles of international law as hierarchically superior to and an integral 
part of French domestic law.77 Thus in the case of Barbie (Argoud)78 the Cour 
d’Appel de Lyon recognized that the crimes alleged were not merely crimes 
against French law but also against international law79 and thus actionable in 
France. The court in Argoud also recognized the primacy of the general princi-
ples of international law as a part of international law.80 While the split be-
tween the executive and legislature on this point seems problematic, claims for 
torts in violation of the law of nations would be ordinarily brought before a 
court of general jurisdiction (Tribunal de Grand Instance) which regards not 
only treaty law but also customary law as an integral part of the French domes-
tic legal order. Consequently, French courts could recognize the possibility of 
an action civile in conjunction with a case prosecuting a crime under custom-
ary international law. Accordingly, we now turn our attention to the action 
civile in French law. 
                                                 
72 ‘la coutume internationale s'oppose à ce que les chefs d'État en exercise puissent, en 
l'absence de dispositions internationales communes s'imposant aux parties concernées, 
faire l'objet de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d'un État étranger’ (Author’s 
translation: international custom prevents making the head of state in office an object 
of the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state, at least absent general international dis-
positions [to the contrary]) Kadhaffi. This is but one example where the cross-currents 
of the ”war on terrorism” and human rights lead to the surprising result of mutually re-
inforcing each other and extending the reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction for torts.  
73 Kdhir, at 1585-1586.  
74 « La jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel accorde peu de place au droit interna-
tional non écrit. » Id. at, 1582.  
75 « ni 1'article 55 de la Constitution ni aucune autre disposition de valeur constitution-
nelle ne prescrit ni n'implique que le juge administratif fasse prévaloir la coutume in-
ternationale sur la loi en cas de conflit entre ces deux normes. » Id. at 1584. 
76 Id., at 1593. 
77 Id.  
78 Cass. Crim., 4 juin l964, Argoud, Bull, p. 410. 
79 Kdhir, at 1585. 
80 Id. 
 20
2. Statute Law 
a) A Hybrid of Tort and Crime: Action Civile 
In principle and practice victims of crime in France have the right to compen-
sation in tort through an action civile.81 One very interesting point of the ac-
tion civile is that it can be initiated by the victim of the crime.82 Historically 
the common law also permitted private persons to initiate prosecutions of 
crimes in order to conserve very limited judicial resources. That is no longer 
the case in the U.S. However, the same conduct may give rise to a proceeding 
in tort or in criminal law. Nevertheless, U.S. common law does not offer a pro-
cedure similar to the action civile even in the civil law jurisdiction of Louisi-
ana83 – though the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO)84 does permit a combination of civil and criminal claims in cases 
combating organized crime. 
In the action civile criminal and tort procedures are combined. That combi-
nation offers a certain judicial economy by reducing the number of court pro-
ceedings. Article 2 of the French Penal Code85 provides that: 
“all who have personally suffered a damage directly caused by the crime have 
a right to reparation of that damage by a civil cause of action. [‘action civile’].  
Renunciation of the civil cause of action in no way suspends or stops the pub-
lic prosecution, subject to the exceptions provided for in line 3 of article 6.”86 
Article 418, paragraph 2 “On the constitution and effects of the civil party” of 
                                                 
81 Stefan Gewaltig, Die action civile im französischen Strafverfahren, Frankfurt am 
Main 1990: Peter Lang, page 6 (hereafter Gewaltig). 
82 Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: 
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 
Cal. L. Rev. 542, 669 (1990). 
83 “In France, by virtue of the procedure of la partie civile, the civil action may be brought 
along with the penal proceedings but such is not the case in Louisiana or the United 
States.” William E. Crawford, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Tort Law, § 3.1. (2000). 
84 18 U.S.C. § 1962 
85 Ordonnance nº 58-1296 du 23 décembre 1958 art. 1, Journal Officiel du 24 décembre 
1958 en vigueur le 2 mars 1959. available at:  
<http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/titre_preliminaire.htm>. 
86 Author’s translation. The original text reads: « L'action civile en réparation du dom-
mage causé par un crime, un délit ou une contravention appartient à tous ceux qui ont 
personnellement souffert du dommage directement causé par l'infraction. La renoncia-
tion à l'action civile ne peut arrêter ni suspendre l'exercice de l'action publique, sous 
réserve des cas visés à l'alinéa 3 de l'article 6. » Ordonnance nº 58-1296 du 23 décem-
bre 1958 art. 1 Journal Officiel du 24 décembre 1958 en vigueur le 2 mars 1959. avai-
lable at: <http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/titre_preliminaire.htm>. 
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the French Code of Criminal Procedure further states that: 
“All persons who, in conformity with Article 2, claim to have been injured by 
a wrong can, if they have not yet done so, move to be considered a civil party 
in the case. No lawyer is required to make this motion before the court. The 
civil party can, in support of their cause of action, ask for damages corre-
sponding to the damages which they have suffered.”87 
Thus all persons who are directly injured through the criminal act have the 
right to compensation for the damages resulting there from.88 However, the 
claim for damages must be made at trial, and may not be first made on ap-
peal.89 Interestingly, civil parties are disqualified from being witnesses in the 
criminal action.90 
An action civile is not only of interest before French courts. The resulting 
compensation from damages to parties civiles may be enforced anywhere the 
defendant's assets can be found – even before common law courts, where fa-
miliar procedures for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are 
well established.91 
The action civile is further evidence for the proposition that criminal liabil-
ity generally creates tort liability. The action civile exists in at least French, 
Belgian, and Senegalese civil law and almost certainly in other jurisdictions 
which model their domestic law on French law. It is the author’s hypothesis 
that a further examination of other civil law jurisdictions would reveal the ac-
tion civile, or a homologue, exists in most civilian jurisdictions. A similar 
cause of action, the Adhäsionsverfahren, also exists in German civil law, 
though it is apparently less often resorted too. Civilian legal systems recognize 
1) the actionability of international crimes in domestic proceedings and 2) the 
possibility that an injured plaintiff may sue the defendant criminal tortfeasor. 
This empirical evidence proves that in the Alien Tort Statute is not idiosyn-
cratic. 
                                                 
87 Article 418, French Code of Criminal Procedure (author’s translation). The original 
text states: « Toute personne qui, conformément à l'article 2, prétend avoir été lésée 
par un délit, peut, si elle ne l'a déjà fait, se constituer partie civile à l'audience même. 
Le ministère d'un avocat n'est pas obligatoire. La partie civile peut, à l'appui de sa 
constitution, demander des dommages-intérêts correspondant au préjudice qui lui a été 
causé. », available at:  
http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/constitution_de_partie_civile_tc.htm. 
88 Art. 2 Code de Procédure Pénale (C.P.P.); Gewaltig, at 8. 
89 Crim. 5.3.1964, J.C.P. 1964.ll.13689; Crim. 25.10.1966, J.C.P. 1966, 1, page 9. 
90 Article 422 French Code of Criminal Procedure, available at:  
<http://lexinter.net/PROCPEN/constitution_de_partie_civile_tc.htm>. 
91 See, e.g., Raulin v. Fischer [1911] 2 K.B. 93 (Eng.). 
 22
b) Article 689 French Code of Criminal Procedure  
(Code de Procédure Pénale) 
Article 689 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure (Code du Procédure 
Pénale), provides that: 
“[t]he authors or accomplices of offences committed outside the territory of 
the Republic can be sued in the French courts and judged by them ... when-
ever an international convention grants jurisdiction to the French courts.”92  
Thus, if the suspect is in France then Universal jurisdiction exists for the 
wrongs listed in these conventions. According to Stern, Art. 689 applies to 
conventions that, according to their terms, are not self-executing such as Arti-
cle 5 of the Torture Convention.93  
3. Case Law 
We have already discussed briefly the case of Klaus Barbie (Argoud) 94 and 
also France v. Khaddafy.95 Here we will look in greater detail at two claims 
litigated in France due to genocide in Rwanda where the plaintiffs made mo-
tions as parties civiles for an action civile. 
a) In Re Munyeshyaka96 
W. Munyeshyaka, a Rwandan national, was charged in France with crimes 
against humanity and genocide. The aggrieved parties also made a claim for 
compensation in tort via the action civile. The lower court ruled that there was 
no jurisdiction in this case because the acts were committed outside of France 
and the victims and perpetrators were not French nationals. The French Cour 
de Cassation partially affirmed and remanded the case on the basis that while 
there was no universal jurisdiction as to genocide there would be universal ju-
                                                 
92 Brigitte Stern, Universal Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity under French 
Law-Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949-Genocide-Torture-Human 
Rights Violations in Bosnia and Rwanda, 93 Am. J. Int’l. L. 525, 528 (April, 1999) 
(translation by Brigitte Stern; hereafter Stern). 
93 Id. 
94 Cass. Crim., 4 juin l964, Argoud, Bull, p. 410. 
95 Kadhaffi. 
96 In Re Munyeshyaka 1998 Bull. crim., No. 2, at 3., Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 6 jan-
vier 1998 (n° de pourvoi: 96-82491) available at:   
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX
1998X01X06X00002X000.> 
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risdiction for torture under Article 689-2 of the Code of Penal Procedure. 
This decision might seem odd at first: after all, genocide is clearly a crime 
under international law. What was the courts reasoning in Munyeshyaka? 
The court notes that the crimes of genocide and complicity thereto are de-
fined in Art. 211-1 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure and by the Con-
vention Against Torture. However, in domestic French law the crime of geno-
cide requires action in concert to execute a plan. In contrast, the crime of tor-
ture (a crime codified in Art. 222 of the French Penal Code) requires no such 
concert of action or plan. Further, the Genocide Convention of 1948 does not 
contain in its own terms any rule of universal jurisdiction. It merely authorizes 
state parties to adjudicate genocidal acts on their own territory or to constitute 
international tribunals to adjudicate such claims. The court thus implies that 1) 
there may have been no concerted plan of action of the Rwandan genocide; 2) 
even if there were, the French courts would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
such a claim under international law absent some positive act of the French 
legislator. 
The court also considered claims of violations of international humanitarian 
law under the Geneva Convention. According to §§ 1 and 2 of Article 112-2, 
French Code of Criminal Procedure,97 criminal principals and accomplices to 
serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, those who 
violate the laws and customs of warfare, and those who commit crimes against 
humanity can, if found in France, be judged before French courts and that as a 
result claims against the defendant on the basis of torture would be able to be 
litigated in France even where victim and perpetrator were not French nation-
als provided the perpetrator be present in France. Having determined that on 
the basis of the facts and allegations that the complaint on the basis of geno-
cide was ill founded, but that a claim against torture would be well founded the 
court partially annulled the earlier proceedings and remanded the case to the 
lower court for determination.  
b) In Re Javor98 
The case of Procureur v. Javor99 involved a criminal prosecution of Javor for 
                                                 
97 Law of 22 May, 1996, n° 96-432. 
98 In Re Javor, 1996 Bull. crim., No. 132, at 379. French Cour de cassation, Criminal 
Chamber, March 26, 1996. (Cour de Cassation (Chambre criminelle) Arrêt 26 mars 
1996 (Javor) N°: 95-81527) available at:  
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=CASS&nod=CXRXAX
1996X03X06X00132X000.> 
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torture of the Yugoslavian claimants who also brought tort claims using the 
action civile. The court noted that according to Art. 689-1 and Art. 689-2 of 
the French Code of Criminal Procedure all persons who, outside of French ter-
ritory, have committed acts of torture as defined in the CAT, can be prosecuted 
and judged by France if found in France. In Javor, however, there was no 
indication at all that the defendants were on French territory. Whether the 
accused is in France must be determined by the prosecutor not the victim. 
Since the defendant was not proven by the prosecutor to be in France claims on 
the basis of Art. 689-1 and Art. 689-2 could not succeed. 
The court did recognize that “all persons who are victims of a crime in con-
travention of the New York Convention [Against Torture of 1984] have a right 
to bring a tort claim [lit. action civile] against the criminal tortfeasor”100 and 
that “denial of this right constitutes denial of an equitable trial as guaranteed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights”.101 However, while true in 
theory in practice the defendant was not in France and thus no claim could be 
made on the basis of the CAT. 
The claims under the CAT could not be heard because of jurisdiction. 
However, plaintiffs also made claims on the basis of the four Geneva conven-
tions which entered into force for France on 28 December 1951. There the 
court noted that state parties agree to make the necessary legislative measures 
to suppress via adequate sanctions grave violations of the terms of those con-
ventions. However, the court also noted: 1) the obligations of those conven-
tions only bind states, and 2) the conventions are not directly applicable in do-
mestic law, and implies the reason therefore is that that particular convention is 
only binding states. Explicitly, the court also notes that the rights guaranteed 
by the four conventions are too general and ambiguous to be directly applica-
ble. Art. 689 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure defining allowable 
cases of universal jurisdiction in France did not apply to the case because the 
four Geneva conventions are not directly applicable. Thus plaintiff had no 
claim on the basis of the Geneva conventions. 
Though no claim was possible in this case on the basis of the Geneva con-
ventions the court did make clear that all treaties are nonetheless an integral 
part of French law implying that on other facts a claim based on the Geneva 
conventions might succeed. The court states: 
“An international convention which is sufficiently precise and does not there-
fore require particular measures prior to its application is directly applicable. 
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100 Id. 
101 Id. (author’s translation). 
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Such a convention [i.e. one sufficiently precise to require no enabling legisla-
tion to have effect in domestic law] creates rights which benefit individu-
als”.102  
As we know, treaties in French law are self executing though they may in cer-
tain circumstance not grant directly enforceable rights to individuals. 
It would be unwise to regard the French concept of “effet direct” as equiva-
lent to Drittwirkung or “self execution”: the French court, though it does speak 
of “effet direct” does not use the term Drittwirkung. A functionalist analysis of 
effet direct looks not at the artificial theoretical constructs created by lawyers 
and judges but rather at the practical effects those constructs have. If we look 
at effet direct on its own terms and as a representative of the French legal sys-
tem rather than trying to force it to fit foreign legal abstract concepts either 
from the common law (self executing treaties) or German law (Drittwirkung) 
we avoid doctrinal confusion since the overlap of these concepts is not perfect. 
Conceptual abstraction permits explanation of a variety of different cases – but 
complex concepts whether adapted, adopted or used as metaphors or analogies 
almost always create at least some confusion when transposed into interna-
tional law or when subsumed into other similar foreign legal concepts. Those 
problems can be avoided simply by considering not the abstraction but the 
concrete cases to which the abstract concept refers. This is the advantage of 
empiric induction. It does not lead to sweeping (or overbroad) conclusions but 
does resolve problems as they arise. 
In any event, the court in Javor does not speak in terms of “self executing 
treaties”. Rather it seems to assume that all treaties are self executing, but that 
some treaties cannot vest rights in individuals without enabling legislation sim-
ply because of their ambiguity. 
Thus, the case against Javor was rejected not because there could be no 
claim under the Geneva conventions but rather because such a claim would 
have to be founded on some positive aspect of domestic French law.  
The court in Javor does not address the issue whether the claim could have 
been made under customary law. Here there would be room for creative 
lawyering. If, as in Javor, there is no French domestic law on which to base the 
claim then the plaintiffs could argue that the facts constitute a violation of cus-
tomary international law and that customary international law is an integral 
part of French domestic law. Just as in the common law, custom is an integral 
part of French law and the ordinary regime of droit commun could be applied 
to international torts, including those torts which are also violations of custom-
                                                 
102 Id. (author’s translation). 
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ary international law.  
On this point, whether and how jurisdiction may be obtained for interna-
tional torts and crimes in French law, Brigitte Stern notes that: 
“These cases [Javor and Munyeshyaka] illustrate the reluctance of the French 
courts to assert universal jurisdiction. This attitude is not a French exception, 
but is quite widespread. According to Kenneth Randall, ‘[t]he universality 
principle remains under-utilized in the struggle to eliminate the most heinous 
crimes of the modern world.’ This explains why in France the cases brought 
against Pinochet did not rely on universal jurisdiction but on passive personal-
ity jurisdiction.”103  
Just as we see that states are reluctant to lift the veil of immunity, so also are 
states hesitant to exercise universal jurisdiction. In fact, however, a compelling 
argument can be made that universal jurisdiction exists to all international 
crimes which are also violations of jus cogens first by looking at the fact that 
universal jurisdiction exists as to pirates and slave traders and also by looking 
at the teleology of the more modern international crimes which represent such 
heinous acts as to be of mutual concern of all nations and thus liable to univer-
sal jurisdiction. In any event, immunity and jurisdiction appear to be the two 
greatest limitations to liability, whether in crime or in torts, for severe viola-
tions of human rights. 
B. Belgium 
Belgium had offered universal jurisdiction in absentia without regard to the 
nationality of the victim or criminal, perhaps the most wide ranging exercise of 
jurisdiction over human rights in the world, certainly in Europe until 2003. 
However, the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium determined that one case prosecuted 
under this statute was a violation of the principle of immunity of acting rank-
ing ministers and could not proceed. This fact, and enormous U.S. pressure, 
caused Belgium to modify its wide ranging law on universal jurisdiction in 
2003.104 The general interpretation is that the new legislation has severely cur-
tailed Belgian extra-territorial jurisdiction. While it is true that now victims 
                                                 
103 Stern, at 529. 
104 Florian Hausweisner, Belgium's Controversial War Crimes Law Amended, 19 Int'l 
Enforcement L. Rep. 449 (November, 2003). See, Loi de 5 Août 2003 relative à la ré-
pression des infractions graves au droit international humanitaire, Title I, Belgian Pe-
nal Code of 5 August 2003, Art. 136 bis, available at:   
<http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/Codepenal2003.html>. 
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must be Belgian or legal residents of Belgium at the time of the crime as we 
will see the statute remains very extensive and in some areas has actually ex-
panded its protections. 
1. The New Legislation 
The new legislation entirely removes the old legislation and in its place modi-
fies several sections of the Belgian Criminal Code. The principal new and 
modified sections of the Penal Code are summarized as follows: 
* Art. 1bis of the Penal Code appears to be a reaction to Congo v. Belgium and 
provides that “In conformity with international law, prosecutions are prohib-
ited against: heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers of for-
eign affairs during their term of office as well as other persons recognized as 
enjoying immunity under international law.”105 Note, however, that this limita-
tion leaves open the possibility of suing those enjoying immunity after termi-
nation of their term of office. 
* Art. 6 of the Belgian Penal Code was amended so that “all Belgians” now 
includes “all Belgians or any other person having their principal residence in 
Belgium”. 
* Art. 10 of the Belgian Penal Code now provides that foreigners can be prose-
cuted in Belgium for violations of human rights protected in Book II, Title 1 of 
the Belgian Penal Code if the victim was a Belgian national or resident or a 
person who, since at least three years in effect resides in Belgium habitually 
and legally.106 
* Art. 12 of the Belgian Penal Code was extended so that not only international 
conventions but also international custom could be the basis of a claim.107 
* Art. 136 was newly created and extensively defines a wide range of criminal 
activities and is extremely generous to victims. Crimes against international 
law under Art. 136 includes, for example, apartheid, destruction of historic 
monuments, and forced resettlements.108 Such crimes can be heard by Belgian 
courts and punished under Belgian law (Art. 43 quarter, § 1, a Belgian Penal 
Code). 
We can conclude from this that while Belgium has limited the claimants to 
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Belgian citizens and legal residents at the time of the crimes it has also broad-
ened its protections to acts such as apartheid and forced resettlements. Further, 
claims may be made not only on the basis of international statute but also on 
the basis of customary law. Thus, the new legislation stands on surer ground. 
Of course it would be desirable if the protections of the Belgian law were ex-
tended at least to the citizens of other EU Member States and if the inquiry was 
not whether the claimant was a legal resident of Belgium at the time of the 
crime but rather at the time of prosecution. That being said, if the jurisdictional 
limits can be overcome plaintiffs would be able to combine their actions with 
claims as parties civiles. We now look at the Belgian law on action civile. 
2. The Action Civile in Belgium 
Belgian civil law, like French civil law, recognizes the existence of an action 
civile for damages in cases of crimes. It is worth noting that accomplices may 
be held liable for acts of principals. Accomplice liability in Belgian law is very 
extensive: The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant accomplice intended 
to aid the criminal principal to achieve the criminal object.109 Plaintiffs need 
not prove fraudulent intention of accomplices to defraud110 or criminal in-
tent.111 Further, all defendants, accomplices, and principals are liable jointly 
and severally for all damages resulting from the criminal tort, even absent any 
overt action or agreement to act in concert.112  
                                                 
109 «Pour être coauteur ou complice, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’il y ait eu intention criminelle 
tendant à porter préjudice à la masse» (Cass. 13 septembre 1989, Rev. dr. pén. 1990, 59). 
(Author’s translation: To be an accomplice or co-author it is not necessary that there have 
been the criminal intent tending to cause injury. (hereafter: accomplice cause). 
110 «Pour condamner en droit un accusé comme coauteur ou complice d’une faillite frau-
duleuse, il n’est pas requis que l’accusé ait agi dans l’intention frauduleuse de porter 
atteinte aux biens; il suffit qu’il soit établi que quelqu’un ait commis ce délit et que 
l’accusé y ait participé d’une des manières énumérées aux articles 66 et 67 du Code 
pénal (art. 489 du Code pénal)» (Cass. AR P. 93.0510.N, 22 mars 1994, Arr. Cass. 
1994, 299). Author’s translation: To legally sanction an accused as accomplice or co-
author of fraudulent bankruptcy it is not necessary that the accused acted with a 
fraudulent intention to damage goods; it suffices that it be established that someone 
has committed this wrong and that the accused participated in one of the manners 
enumerated in articles 66 and 67 of the Penal Code. 
111 Id. 
112 «Toutes les personnes condamnées pour un même délit sont tenues dans leur propre 
chef d’indemniser la partie civile, quel que soit le degré de participation de chacune 
d’elles au délit commun, et même si entre les personnes condamnées il n’y avait ni ac-
cord préalable, ni unité d’action» (Cass. 22 décembre 1947, Arr. Cass. 1947, 425) ». 
Author’s translation: All persons found guilty of one crime are held individually re-
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Having examined the Belgian statutory law we can now examine the cases 
litigated under those laws and their predecessor law to suppress grave breaches 
of international humanitarian law. 
3. Case Law 
How have the statutes worked in practice? The Belgian criminal laws, though 
curtailed as to victims who may sue, have in fact been substantively extended 
as outlined above. Though Belgium has procedurally limited access to its 
courts Belgium could legally extend its protection not merely to residents at 
the time of the crime but also to those who have become Belgian residents 
since the crime and even to other residents and citizens of EU Member States. 
The earlier Belgian legislation was not illegal, but rather impractical; the courts 
were somewhat overwhelmed with claimants, and some claims were not meri-
torious. Most importantly, the Belgian legislation angered the United States 
and Israel. But these political problems do not go to the legality of the statute 
rather to its political practicality. With that thought we now look at some liti-
gated Belgian cases. 
a) The Ariel Sharon Cases 
A claim in tort was brought in Belgium against the head of state of Israel, Ariel 
Sharon, as well as several other Israeli defendants for massacres of Palestinian 
civilians at the Sabra and Shattila refugee camps which occurred prior to 
Sharon’s term of office as head of state. The case was initially determined in-
admissible as to all defendants. However, on appeal that decision was partially 
reversed. The Belgian appeals court ruled that the case against Sharon would 
not be considered as he was an acting head of state entitled to immunity for all 
acts, even those occurring prior to his term of office. However, the other de-
fendants did not enjoy immunity and the jurisdiction was valid.113 As to them 
the case was allowed to go forward even in absentia.114 The Belgian Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                      
sponsible to indemnify the civil party, whatever their degree of individual participa-
tion in the common crime, and even if among the condemned there was no agreement 
prior to the crime nor any unity of action. 
113 Sharon, Ariel, Yaron, Amos et Autres, Arrêt de la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles, 
26/6/2002, available at: <http://www.sabra-shatila.be/documents/arrest020626.pdf>. 
114 Alain Winants, The Yerodia Ruling of the International Court off Justice and the 
1993/1999 Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction, 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 508 (October, 2003). 
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Court consequently affirmed this decision.115 However, in the interim the ICJ 
at the case of Congo v. Belgium ruled that head of state immunity extended 
also to ranking ministers thus sowing confusion and injustice in the Belgian 
laws. This, and enormous pressure from the United States, caused Belgium to 
modify its law on universal jurisdiction. Consequently, in a second decision by 
the Belgian Supreme Court the case was dismissed in its entirety.116 Let us 
then look at Congo v. Belgium to see exactly how procedural issues blunted 
substantive justice. 
b) Belgium v. Congo 
The ICJ case Congo v. Belgium appears to have been crucial in the hobbling of 
the Belgian law. We examine that decision to understand its limits in order to 
see what might still be done to the Belgian legislation to make it more effec-
tive. We conclude that the Belgian legislation could at least offer a cause of 
action to persons who are Belgian citizens or residents or EU citizens or resi-
dents at the time of the lawsuit. We also conclude that jurisdiction in absentia 
remains a possibility though the issue of whether and when non-Belgian vic-
tims may bring a cause of action is actually more important. Finally we con-
clude that the decision of the ICJ is morally indefensible and suffers from 
flawed logic. 
i. Immunity 
The Belgian law of universal jurisdiction in absentia, as applied in a Belgian 
case, was adjudicated by the International Court of Justice and found incom-
patible with international law in the case Congo v. Belgium. In Congo v. Bel-
gium117 the ICJ distinguishes between absolute and relative universal jurisdic-
tion. In that case Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Congolese minister of for-
eign affairs, was indicted by Belgium for war crimes during his term of office. 
During the court proceedings the term of the minister’s office ended. The min-
ister raised as a defence that at the time of indictment he enjoyed ministerial 
                                                 
115 Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 12 Fevrier, 2003. Unofficial English translation available 
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116 Procureur contre Ariel Sharon et Consorts, Cour de Cassation, Arrêt de 24/9/2003, 
available at:  
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117 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), ICJ 
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immunity. The defence was upheld. However, the court’s determination that 
ministers enjoy immunity during their term of office appears to rest on fiat of 
the court and appears to have no authority of custom or treaty underlying it. 
The court’s finding that official acts which constitute war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and crimes against the peace may, indeed must, enjoy im-
munity as to heads of state and ranking ministers is simply illogical and inde-
fensible. 
The international court did not rule against Belgium on the theory that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia was invalid per se. A majority of 
the judges clearly think that universal jurisdiction in absentia can be valid118. 
Instead the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium ruled against Belgium on the basis of im-
munity. According to the ICJ, government Ministers are analogous to heads of 
state and thus are immune as to official acts during their term of office even 
after expiry of their term. One can rightly ask, however, where this analogy 
comes from, for it seems to be purely an invention of the court. Congo v. Bel-
gium is a rather shocking decision actually; the crimes of which the former 
minister was accused were clearly in violation of jus cogens yet the court is 
arguing that they must be granted immunity. Applying this logic several prose-
cutions at the Nuremburg or Tokyo tribunals should have been rejected. Un-
surprisingly, the decision is severely criticized. We will consider that decision 
and its critique in order to see the limits international law places on exercise of 
jurisdiction and the rules it imposes on immunity of government officials. 
The ICJ decision reached the conclusion that it is a firmly established rule 
of international law that high ranking government official enjoy immunity as 
to their official acts both in civil and criminal cases arising out of customary 
international law – even in cases where those acts are violations of jus co-
gens!119 The ICJ attempted to defend the indefensible offering the trite and 
unsatisfying rhyme that ‘immunity’ does not mean ‘impunity’. The court notes 
that Ministers who are also international criminals can be prosecuted “(i) in 
their own country; (ii) in other states, if the state they represent waives immu-
nity; (iii) after they cease holding office; and (iv) before an international 
court.”120 Obviously in practice none of these prosecutions will ever happen so 
the argument rings hollow. For example, acts committed during the term of 
office, so long as they are official acts, will be immune to prosecution even 
after the termination of the term of office. Thus, only acts undertaken for per-
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sonal benefit and not in the service of the state will no longer be immunized 
after expiration of the term of office.121 Winants rightly criticizes the ICJ’s 
argument, calling potential prosecution “hypothetical” at best. He also criti-
cizes the argument from analogy that a high ranking minister is like a head of 
state or diplomat which he also sees as a weak one. He also points out that the 
court ignores recent developments in international law.122 Thus, Winants states 
that the ruling of the ICJ on immunities is: “very doctrinal and narrow-
minded” and is “likely… to lead to a de facto total impunity of high ranking 
office holders”.123 He points out rightly that some crimes can only be commit-
ted with the state as their instrumentality and reiterates Lord Steyn’s argument 
in Pinochet 1, that if immunity applies to official acts of state then “when Hit-
ler ordered the ‘final solution’ his act must be regarded as an official act deriv-
ing from the exercise of his functions as Head of State’”.124 It is simply absurd 
to offer immunity to mass murderers in the interests of “order”. Winants con-
cludes that: “It may well be that the Belgian approach is foolhardy, but in con-
trast to this the ruling of the ICJ is lacking in courage”125 which seems to me a 
polite way to call someone a coward. Winants critique is in all events well 
founded. The ICJ has taken one step backward to excusing the worst acts of 
barbarism in the interest of elevating “order” above “justice”. The ICJ’s ration-
ale is based on a flawed assumption of international law that order is the pri-
mary concern of international law since order is a precondition to justice. That 
presumption is false – ultimately, justice creates order and injustice creates 
disorder – and is increasingly rejected as sovereignty evolves from an absolute 
hermetic Westphalian conception to relativised and increasingly integrated 
view due to globalisation of communication, production, and trade. 
ii. Relative and Absolute Universal Jurisdiction 
If the court decision in Congo v. Belgium is basically substantively indefensi-
ble is there anything to be salvaged from the erroneous decision which ignores 
basic principles of morality and justice? The more interesting portion of Congo 
v. Belgium concerns a distinction made by several judges in their separate 
opinions between “absolute” and “relative” universal jurisdiction (“compé-
tence universelle” and “compétence universelle par défaut”). Again, the court 
seems to be struggling to invent new terms to cope with the new legal reality 
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resulting from globalisation. The ideas of “absolute” and “relative” universal 
jurisdiction, though conceptually defensible, do not appear to have been a part 
of international discourse prior to Congo v. Belgium. That can be seen in the 
fact that the terms in French and English are different. “Universal jurisdiction 
by default” would be a better translation of “compétence universelle par 
défaut” than absolute jurisdiction. Similarly the term “relativisé” appears no-
where in the term “compétence universelle” which then would also translate as 
– universal jurisdiction! 
According to the separate opinions of several judges in Congo v. Belgium, 
absolute universal jurisdiction (compétence universelle par défaut) is asserted 
when the state exercising jurisdiction to prescribe has no link to the act over 
which jurisdiction is asserted.126 For example, where a defendant is not on the 
territory of the state and where the act did not occur on the territory of the state 
or involved any of its nationals there is a “défaut” (absence, default) of the de-
fendant and any exercise of jurisdiction is universal in the widest sense of the 
term i.e. “absolute”. In contrast, where there is some connection between the 
act over which jurisdiction is exercised and the territory or nationals of the 
state exercising jurisdiction to proscribe we can speak of relative universal ju-
risdiction or “compétence universelle” – for there is no absent defendant or ab-
sent act.127 
The ICJ in Congo v. Belgium implies that relative universal jurisdiction is 
permissible under international law128 and draws a distinction between absolute 
universal jurisdiction and relative universal jurisdiction.129 It does not determine 
when or whether absolute universal jurisdiction is permissible, though the his-
toric example of pirates indicates that in some instances absolute jurisdiction is 
admissible under international law. Pirates are hostes humani generis,130 ene-
mies of all mankind, and as such are subject to universal jurisdiction. War 
criminals, mass murderers and those who torture are also enemies of mankind 
and should also be subject to absolute universal jurisdiction.131 Relative univer-
                                                 
126 Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? 
Some Comments on The Congo v. Belgium Case, European Journal of International 
Law, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 853 available at: <http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr31-
03.html#31-3> (hereafter Cassese). 
127 See, Congo v. Belgium, opinion of President Guillaume and opinion of Judge Higgins, 
Kooigmans and Buergenthal.  
128 Id. 
129 Cassese. 
130 See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153; 5 L. Ed. 57; 1820 U.S. LEXIS 250; 5 Wheat. 153 
(1820). 
131 „Folterer, Mörder und Kriegsverbrecher sollten wie früher Piraten und Sklavenhändler 
als Feinde des Menschengeschlechts behandelt werden.“ (author’s translation: “Those 
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sal jurisdiction is, however, a lesser infringement on another state’s sovereignty 
than absolute universal jurisdiction. An exercise of relative jurisdiction would 
therefore be more likely to be seen as consistent with a state’s international obli-
gations. 
Congo v. Belgium does not address the issue of the permissibility of abso-
lute universal jurisdiction.132 However, state practice is increasingly admitting 
universal jurisdiction, including absolute universal jurisdiction.133 Thus, rea-
soning a maiore ad minus, relative universal jurisdiction is probably valid un-
der customary international law. 
Absolute universal jurisdiction is somewhat controversial, particularly in 
criminal cases. Yet in some cases, for example piracy, and probably war 
crimes as well, absolute criminal jurisdiction is clearly permissible under in-
ternational law. States may legally exercise their power to prescribe outside of 
their territory under: 1) a theory of passive personality, wherein a state can 
prosecute crimes against its nationals, 2) a theory of active personality, 
wherein it prosecutes its criminal nationals or 3) under the protective principle 
which permits a state to defend emanations of its sovereignty outside its own 
territory such as its currency against counterfeiters.134 These are not the only 
theories under which jurisdiction to prescribe may be legally exercised. But 
these are the main theories. Absolute universal jurisdiction is less problematic 
in civil cases135 because there is no question of the state exercising power over 
a life or liberty interest but merely over a property right. 
In sum, the court in Congo v. Belgium admits at least that Ministerial im-
munity is not an absolute right and can be at least waived if not derogated 
from. Further the court did not rule that jurisdiction in absentia was per se ille-
gal. Still, the argument that a Minister can be immune for acts which are viola-
tions of jus cogens due to immunity simply runs contrary to the trend of inter-
national law since Nuremberg. Consequently, it is possible that the customary 
practice of states will outpace the court which they created and that the authors 
of the majority opinions in Congo v. Belgium will one day feel embarrassed, if 
                                                                                                                                                      
who torture and commit war crimes should, like the pirate and slave handler of yore, 
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not ashamed, at their failure to protect the innocent victims of failed states. Af-
ter all, it is the practice of states which makes international customary law, the 
ICJ merely confirms it. Legal decisions in international law are only persuasive 
evidence of customary international law.136  
C. Senegal – The Habré Cases 
It might seem odd to look at the law of a developing country to determine how 
to protect human rights globally via private tort law. However, the third world 
is where most human rights abuses occur. Further Senegal, a former French 
colony, is an ACP.; Member and its legal system is modelled on that of France. 
Like France and Belgium, Senegal is a civil law country signatory to the New 
York Convention Against Torture of 1984 (CAT) offering its plaintiffs extra-
territorial jurisdiction in a very limited number of cases and also offering vic-
tims of crimes the possibility of constituting themselves as parties to the case 
in action civile. A famous case against Chad’s former dictator, Hissène Habré 
was litigated in Senegal which we now examine to see the extent and limits of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in a developing third world country. 
The relevant cases we will briefly examine are Ministère Public et François 
Diouf v. Hissène Habré137 and Souleymane Guengueng et autres v. Hissène 
                                                 
136 “With respect to the International Court of Justice, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute ex-
pressly states that '[t]he decision[s] of the Court ha[ve] no binding force except be-
tween the parties and in respect of that particular case.' ICJ Statute, June 26, 1945, art. 
59, 59 Stat. 1055, U.S.T.S. 993. With respect to the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Court is only empowered to ‘interpret[ ]’ and ‘appl[y]’ the rules set forth in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5 (‘European 
Convention’) – an instrument applicable only to its regional States parties--not to cre-
ate new rules of customary international law. See European Convention art. 32 (stat-
ing that the Court's jurisdiction ‘extend[s] to all matters concerning the interpretation 
and application of the Convention’); see also ICJ Statute art. 38 (listing judicial deci-
sions as ‘subsidiary,’ rather than primary, sources of customary international law). 
Accordingly, the international tribunal decisions cited by plaintiffs are not primary 
sources of customary international law. …these decisions may constitute subsidiary or 
secondary sources”, Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. 343 F.3d 140, 169-170, 62 
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 741, (2nd Cir., Aug 29, 2003) (also explaining that ECHR deci-
sions are at most a secondary source of international law. 
137 Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000). 
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Habré138. The aforementioned appellate decision determined that an action 
civile and criminal prosecution against former Chadien dictator Hissène Habré 
was not admissible in Senegalese domestic law because “Senegalese positive 
law does not at present include a cause of action for crimes against human-
ity”.139 Art. 295-1 of the Senegalese Penal Code does provide for a cause of 
action for torture, thus meeting Senegal’s treaty obligations under Art. 4 of the 
Convention Against Torture. However, Art. 669 of the Senegalese Code of 
Criminal Procedure only admits universal jurisdiction under an express num-
ber of limited cases, namely for crimes and torts which threaten the security of 
the state (as opposed to the security of its citizens) and for counterfeiting.140 
The court notes the fact that a crime is universally punishable does not neces-
sarily mean that a particular court has jurisdiction to punish,141 i.e. it reiterates 
that while states have a duty not to commit acts in violation of jus cogens they 
do not have a duty to remedy other state’s violations of jus cogens.142 The 
court in Ministère Public et François Diouf v. Hissène Habré interprets the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction enumerated in Art. 699 Code of Criminal Procedure 
as an exhaustive list of all possible jurisdiction. That is probably the better. 
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that the Convention Against Torture 
displaces Art. 699, again likely correctly.143  
In its own terms then the decision seems to conclude that Senegal does not 
recognize the jurisdiction of its own courts to punish crimes against customary 
international law absent a Senegalese statute transposing those crimes into do-
mestic law as domestic crimes or through explicit mention in the Senegalese 
Penal Code as crimes over which extraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised 
and possibly both. While the decision has been criticized as being the product 
of executive intervention,144 there are some points for hope within its terms. 
Though a court in Senegal may not consider itself properly seized to adjudicate 
the case of Habré, because its statute on extraterritorial jurisdiction does not go 
                                                 
138 Arrêt n° 14 du 20-3-2001 Pénal (Cour de Cassation, 2001). 
139 Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-2000 / Accusation (Senegal: Cour d'appel de Dakar, 2000). 
140 Ministère Public Et François Diouf Contre Hissene Habré, Arrêt n° 135 du 04-07-
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141 Id., Point 3°, decision on the merits ( « sur le fond »). 
142 Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F.Supp. 1108. 
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144 Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of Hissein Habré, 
16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 147 169-170 (Spring, 2003); Reed Brody, The Prosecution Of 
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far enough, the court does recognize the principle “aut dedere, aut judi-
care”.145 The court also recognizes that Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention pro-
hibits a state from interposing its domestic law to excuse its non-observance of 
a treaty obligation.146 Consequently, in the face of an extradition request, the 
court implies that Senegal would be compelled to deliver Habré to a state 
which was willing to prosecute him. 
Interestingly, the Senegalese appellate court (Cour d’appel) cites French 
law. It notes that, after France enacted Art. 221-1 of the French Penal Code, 
which criminalized torture it then enacted the Law of 16 December 1992, (en-
try into force, 1 March 1994), which introduced Art. 689 into the French Code 
of Criminal Procedure. Art. 689 permits universal jurisdiction over a number 
of crimes including torture. Thus, the Senegalese court seems to accept the 
decision of the French court – that the court requires the enactment of a special 
law granting jurisdiction over crimes of torture – as persuasive evidence as to 
Senegalese. The results are of course unfavourable for human rights but inter-
nal logic is not wholly absent from the court’s argument. 
This case was appealed to the Senegalese Supreme Court (Cour de Cass-
ation) which affirmed the results of the Appellate court (Cour d’appel) for es-
sentially the same reason, noting, however, that Habré was under house arrest 
and again implying that he could be extradited to another country if so ac-
cused.147 Since these cases were litigated an action has been brought against 
Habré in Belgium.148 This may be the best hope for justice in this case, so it 
may not yet be over.149 
D. Germany 
The final European Member State whose law we shall examine is Germany. 
We are looking at German law last because the majority of civil law countries 
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in Europe more closely follow French civil law. However, as German civil law 
has some basic differences – notably, a greater emphasis on case law and less 
emphasis on deduction of rules of law from general principles as well as less 
doctrinal influence on the substantive law it certainly merits investigation. 
German civil law is more recent and thus seen as more modern and has suc-
cessfully been exported to countries throughout the Far East and Eastern 
Europe. Further, the German doctrine of Drittwirkung strongly influences the 
question of individual rights both with respect to the state and among private 
persons inter se. Since our discussion of third party effect (Drittwirkung) im-
mediately follows this chapter it seems appropriate to close this chapter with a 
brief examination of German law. We will see, however, that though there are 
some differences between German and French civil law that they are more 
similar than different as to the question of whether and when individuals have 
directly enforceable rights before national courts for claims arising out of in-
ternational law. 
1. German Statute Law 
a) Adhäsionsverfahren 
The Adhäsionsverfahren is the German homologue to the action civile. Essen-
tially, like the action civile, it permits the incorporation of tort claims in a 
criminal trial in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments and for rea-
sons of judicial economy. 
According to § 403 para 1 line 1 Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) in-
jured parties can make claims for monetary compensation in criminal trials. 
The right to compensation is covered in § 823 para 2 German Civil Code 
(BGB) in connection with § 266 German Criminal Code (StGB). Thus, at least 
in theory, it would be possible to bring an Adhäsionsverfahren so that a crimi-
nal prosecution would also result in compensation to claimants. Such proce-
dures are, however, in practice rare. There are several possible reasons for this: 
The plaintiff must know that they have the right; the plaintiff must take the ini-
tiative and ask for the application of the right; plaintiffs may prefer to go be-
fore the civil courts; the Adhäsionsverfahren is obscure and complicates the 
proceedings; and, finally, the penal judge may be uncomfortable determining 
the existence and extent of tort damages. Despite these reservations, the Ad-
häsionsverfahren, like the action civile and Alien Tort Statute, is evidence of 
the general principle of law that ordinarily crimes imply corresponding torts 
which can be the basis of a claim under customary international law in those 
states where customary international law is an integral part of the domestic le-
gal order – the case of France, Britain, and the United States. 
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b) § 7 German Criminal Code (StGB) 
German law applies the passive personality extraterritorial jurisdiction in § 7 
of the German Penal Code which states: 
“(1) German penal law applies to acts which in foreign countries are directed 
against Germans when the act at the place where the action occurred is sanc-
tioned by punishment or the place of the act is under no sovereign’s penal law. 
(2) For other acts which occur in foreign countries German penal law applies 
when the deed at the place of the act is sanctioned by punishment or the place 
of the act is under no sovereign’s penal law and the actor 
1. at that time was a German or since the occurrence of the act has ac-
quired German nationality or 
2. at the time of the act was a foreigner and is in Germany and, although 
the extradition law permits his extradition according he has not been ex-
tradited because no extradition request was placed or the extradition re-
quest was denied or the extradition is not executable.”150  
Thus, for example, where a German citizen sexually abuses a minor child citi-
zen of Kazakhstan and then returns to Germany and such sexual abuse is pun-
ishable both under the law of Kazakhstan and in German law the criminal act 
may be punished in Germany despite the passage of the statute of limita-
tions151 since (like RICO) § 7 StGB looks not at procedural aspects of foreign 
law but rather only to the substance of the law. It seems that Germany has a 
doctrine similar to British double actionability which requires that extraterrito-
rial crime be punishable both in the domestic and foreign legal system. 
2. German Case Law 
a) Malenkovic 
In the Malenkovic152 (Varvarin bridge) case the Yugoslavian survivors and 
relatives of a NATO air-strike against a bridge in Yugoslavia sued Germany in 
German courts for a violation of the Geneva conventions arguing that the 
bridge attacked was a civilian target. The facts of this case are thus very simi-
                                                 
150 Author’s translation. 
151 BGH 3 StR 437/99 – Beschluss v. 08. März 2000 (LG Hannover). 
152 Malenkovic, Beschluss v. 10 Oktober 2003 (LG Bonn), Az.: 1 O 361/02 available at: 
<http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb10/frieden/themen/NATO-Krieg/varvarin-urteil.html>; 
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lar to those of Bankovic.153 Unfortunately, the result was also similar: no li-
ability was found. 
The German trial court (1st Civil Chamber, Landgericht Bonn) determined 
that the case was admissible jurisdictionally as founded on § 18 Civil Process 
Ordinance (ZPO).154 However, the substantive claim was determined to be 
without merit.155 The plaintiff was required to pay the defendant’s costs, 
which is the ordinary rule in Europe, unlike the U.S. On the merits, the court 
determined that the plaintiff had no cause of action either in German domestic 
law or in international law and rejected the argument that Art. 25 of the Ger-
man Constitution (Grundgesetz) would allow a remedy under international law 
for even if Art. 25 applied the court determined that no violation of interna-
tional law existed. 
Though the court admits that torts in violation of the law of nations can ex-
ist it ascribes the right of remedy not to the individual injured but to their state 
relying on the rule that, generally, individuals have no legal personality in in-
ternational law. This erroneous view merits a probing analysis in order to 
demonstrate why it is also a dangerous view. 
It may have been true in 1940 that, aside from the exceptions of piracy and 
slave-trading, individuals had no directly enforceable rights under international 
law. Today, however, that principle admits of many more exceptions, and 
those exceptions are growing. As recently as 1970 torture may not have been 
banned under customary international law. Today it clearly is. 
The court in Malenkovic attempts to explain away the many exceptions to 
the increasingly anachronistic and outdated rule by attributing the enforcement 
of individual rights under international law to states. The court even goes so far 
as to try to argue that individual rights arise not from custom – despite plenty 
of state practice to the contrary – and attempts, unpersuasively, to argue that 
individual rights arise under international law only out of conventions and trea-
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ties. The court at best is unintelligent, at worst dishonest. Obviously all rights 
are enforced by states! Taking the courts logic to its conclusion no individual 
anywhere has any right – for they must depend on the state for the defence of 
that right. And that reveals the danger of the courts reasoning: it elevates the 
state above the people who constitute it. If people do not have rights, except as 
mediated by states, then all freedoms are enjoyed only at the grace of the state. 
Any totalitarian would be pleased with the courts reasoning. However, the 
court exactly reverses the roles of the people who constitute the state in order 
to protect their rights. One can justifiably call the decision in Malenkovic reac-
tionary. The same result could have been reached on other more defensible 
grounds. In any event, the Declaration des Droits de l’Homme, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and countless constitutions all echo one com-
monality: States do not create human rights. They recognize them. States, con-
stituted by persons, are compelled to recognize human rights because they are 
inherent to the human condition. The fact that states do not always recognize 
human rights does not change the fact of their existence. It is exactly because 
human rights are of universal validity that they can be enforced against outlaw 
and pariah regimes. Human rights are inherent to the human condition and thus 
inalienable, and states ignore this fact at their own peril: international law ad-
mits a right of self determination and to democracy. Essentially, though the 
court may not realize it, it is arguing that human rights are a mere creation of 
the state and can thus be destroyed at will, which is the essence of totalitarian-
ism. The court thus elevates a legal fiction above reality. Further, if we exam-
ine the national and international instruments it is clear that human rights are 
not conceived by other states or the international system as anything other than 
an inherent and thus inalienable part of the human condition. Finally, the 
court’s reasoning is tautological: all legal rights are enforced by states. So ar-
guing that human rights are something other than inherent and inalienable (an 
argument which would please any fascist) because those rights are protected 
(or not) by states ignores the real question: whether, and why, per the court, 
human rights are alienable. The court does not answer that question because it 
cannot, at least not defensibly within a liberal legal order.  
How does the court’s flawed tautological argument play out? Legally 
speaking, the court’s argument, which fundamentally opposes human rights, 
ignores the role of jus cogens and also natural law in shaping individual human 
rights in international law. As Justinian, Cicero,156 Aquinas, and Aristotle157 
                                                 
156 Aquinas's famous maxim is “Lex Mala, Lex Nulla” – a bad law is no law at all. Aqui-
nas echos earlier statements by Justinian and Cicero, for example: “What of the many 
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serve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers might pass in their assembly.... 
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argue, immoral laws are not law at all but at most a perversion of the law. As 
we saw in the case of Eichmann, some conduct is so heinous as to escape the 
ordinary procedural safeguards of non-retroactivity because it is wrong in all 
places and at all times. The allegations in Eichmann, if true, were so heinous 
that any person should naturally have recoiled in horror. The court's argument, 
like so many erroneous positivist arguments of the last bloody century ignores 
entirely the subordination of law to morality which must exist in any just legal 
order. 
Returning to Malenkovic, the court acknowledged that the European Con-
vention on Human Rights in Art. 5 (5) creates a directly enforceable individual 
right via Art. 34 ECHR. However, the court applies the same logic as Bank-
ovic, that the ECHR does not apply, because the bombardment took place out-
side of the jurisdiction of any contracting state party and thus does not meet the 
jurisdictional requirement of Art. 1 ECHR.158 Just as in Bankovic, this ignores 
that the planes flew from NATO basis under orders from state parties to the 
ECHR. The court thus presents us with a fine piece of formalism in the service 
of inhumanity. 
Arguments by the plaintiffs were also made on the basis of the Hague con-
vention on land warfare. The court rejects the argument that the Hague conven-
tion on land warfare only applies between state parties and any right of com-
pensation therein is the right of the state and not the individual.159 Similarly 
the court ruled that the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilians in War 
and its optional protocol only applies to the relations of state parties and not to 
their citizens stating that while civilians “enjoy protection” under Art. 51 of 
                                                                                                                                                      
[T]herefore Law is the distinction between things just and unjust, made in agreement 
with that primal and most ancient of all things, Nature; and in conformity to Nature's 
standard are framed those human laws which inflict punishment upon the wicked but 
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157 “If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, 
and insist on its greater equity and justice.” Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Ar-
istotle, “Rhetoric”, page 1374 (1941). For Aristotle customary law and natural law ap-
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158 Malenkovic, citing ECHR case 12.12.2001, EuGRZ 2002, 133. 
159 Art. 2-3 Hague Convention on Land Warfare, 18 October 1907 (Art. 2 HLKO). The 
court also refers the reader to the Distomo case, German Supreme Court (BGH), 
judgement of 26 June 2003, Az.: III ZR 245/98, published in NJW 2003, 3488 et seq., 
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(hereafter BGH, 26.6.2003). For more details see German Supreme Court decision of 
13.6.1996, (BGH Az.: III ZR 40/95, in NJW 1996, 3208 f). 
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that convention that does not give rise to a corresponding right legally enforce-
able by an individual. Even Art. 51’s provisions for liability do not create 
rights enforceable by individuals according to the court noting that the Con-
vention and its Protocol do not establish any procedure for individuals to make 
claims. 
The court also rejects plaintiff’s argument that the complainants right stems 
from the law of German state liability. The court admits that the individual 
may have guaranties in national law more extensive than those in international 
law, but in Malenkovic holds that such is not the case. The plaintiffs’ attempt 
to rely on the general liability principles of German tort law embodied in § 823 
of the German Civil Code (BGB) also fails160 because German state-liability 
for torts does not exist in the case of armed conflicts. Rather, such cases are 
governed by international humanitarian law161 and, essentially, the German 
court sees the state-liability regime as “suspended” in time of war leaving only 
the province of international law – which as we saw earlier the court believed, 
erroneously, did not directly give rights (or duties) to individuals. For similar 
reasons the court rejected the liability of the Civil Service.162 
What is surprising about the Malenkovic decision is not that liability was 
not found, but rather the reasons for which it was not found. Plaintiffs in both 
Bankovic and Malenkovic argued that the aircraft flew from bases in Europe 
and were directed to do so by European states. Consequently it could be logi-
cally argued that while the targets were not under jurisdiction for Art. 1 of the 
ECHR the tortfeasor was. The courts also completely ignore that sending the 
bombers was an exercise of jurisdiction – jurisdiction to enforce. Ignoring that, 
even if one accepted the courts’ decision as to Art. 1 ECHR that still leaves the 
fact that the plaintiffs may have had tort claims under customary international 
law. The court in Malenkovic essentially ignores any possibility that the plain-
tiffs might, as individuals, have rights against the tortfeasors, say for air-piracy 
or state terrorism. The court could of course have reached the same result 
merely by arguing that the actions of the pilots were acto jure imperii and that 
as such they were subject to immunity. Instead it takes a conservative, even 
reactionary, approach and ignores the trend toward recognizing that individuals 
do in fact have directly enforceable rights and duties under international law 
and the existence of customary international law to that effect. To add insult to 
injury the court requires the plaintiffs, who have lost their relatives to a possi-
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bly illegal aerial bombardment, to pay compensation of the defendants’ court 
costs. 
b) The Distomo Case 
In the Distomo case,163 Greek plaintiffs sued the German government for 
compensation for a massacre of 300 Greek nationals in 1944. Though the case 
had been heard by the highest Greek court (finding for plaintiff),164 the Ger-
man Supreme Court did not give res judicata effect to that decision for proce-
dural reasons.165 On the merits, the German Supreme Court (BGH) determined 
that the act, though illegal, was nonetheless subject to state immunity166 be-
cause individuals in 1944 had no directly enforceable individual rights under 
international law, and thus a claim made now for an act in violation of interna-
tional law in 1944 does not result in a right to compensation.167 The court also 
argues that only states had directly enforceable rights under international law 
at the time of the crime.168 
The court also determined that the appeals court was correct in finding that 
the Federal Law for Compensation of Victims of national-socialist persecu-
tion169 did not apply. The court did agree, however, that it could hear the claim 
as an ordinary tort claim. Though Art. 5 (2) of the London Convention170 had 
held such claims in suspension until a final settlement of the peace the “two 
plus four treaty”171 operated in fact as the necessary final settlement of the 
war.172 However, once again, state immunity prevented any valid substantive 
claim. 
The court also noted that there was no liability of the civil service under 
§ 839 German Civil Code – just as in Malenkovic. This raises the issue of par-
allels and divergences between Distomo and Malenkovic. 
                                                 
163 BGH, 26.6.2003. 
164 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No 11/2000, Judgment of 
4 May 2000, Greek Areopag. Note however that a later decision refused to enforce the 
judgment against German assets in Greece on the basis of internal Greek law render-
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165 Distomo, BGH, NJW 2003, pp. 3488-3489. 
166 Id. 
167 Id., at 3491. 
168 Id. 
169 Bundesentschädigungsgesetz – BEG of 18 September 1953 (BGBl. I p. 1387). 
170 Published 4 July 1956, BGBl. II S. 864. 
171 12 September 1990, BGBl. II S. 1318; in force since 15 March 1991, BGBl. II S. 585. 
172 BGH, NJW 2003, 3488, at 3490. 
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Though Malenkovic was decided by the absence of jurisdiction and not by 
reason of state-immunity, Distomo and Malenkovic are parallel in that Distomo 
holds that in a war-zone ordinary rules of liability are largely suspended and 
that individuals do not generally have directly enforceable rights under interna-
tional law. However, Distomo is a better decision because 1) the court in Dis-
tomo recognizes the evolution toward directly enforceable individual rights 
and duties under international law, 2) the court in Distomo reaches the real is-
sue: whether states are immune for violations of jus cogens, but limits its deci-
sion to the facts of the case, holding that states are currently immune for past 
violations of international law if the state would have been immune at the time 
of the violation of international law. Thus, the court in Distomo, unlike the 
court in Malenkovic, leaves room for evolution of the law either as to whether 
immunity would not apply to an Act of State in violation of jus cogens today. 
The court in Distomo also seems more open to the idea of the possibility of 
directly enforceable individual rights under international law than in Malenk-
ovic, though holding that such rights do not in fact exist given the facts of the 
Distomo case. 
We can also compare Distomo to Sampson v. Germany 173 at least on the 
facts and note that the parallel U.S. case reaches the same results for similar 
reasons: state immunity. It seems rather clear that immunity is, internationally, 
the greatest obstacle to remedies for individual claimants in cases of serious 
violations of international law. The second greatest obstacle, at least in Ger-
many, is the persistence of the notion that international law only grants reme-
dies to states. However, as was abundantly demonstrated in American, British, 
and Francophone law this is simply no longer no longer a valid view of inter-
national law. On this point Germany, or at least the court in Malenkovic, finds 
itself taking the minority view. 
Synthesis: Private Law Protection of Human Rights before the 
E.U. Member States 
As we have seen plaintiffs are not without remedies in the cases brought before 
domestic courts of the Member States of the European Union for extra-
territorial violations of human rights law, including the possibility of making 
claims for compensation as parties civiles in an action civile. In theory this 
would also be possible in German law through the Adhäsionsverfahren. 
Though it is clear that the principal remedy for human rights violations in 
                                                 
173 Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany (1997) 975 F. Supp. 1108. 
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Europe is criminal prosecution and the principal remedy for human rights vio-
lations in U.S. law is tort, both systems do not exclusively rely on tort law or 
criminal law to punish, deter, and compensate victims of human rights viola-
tions even where those victims are not nationals of the forum jurisdiction. Tort 
law and criminal law should play complementary roles in preventing and 
remedying violations of human rights. 
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Part II: Private Law Protection of Human Rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Introduction 
What are the possibilities and limits of tort law as a remedy for violations of 
private rights of individuals under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)? To ultimately answer that question we will first consider: some 
points of general interpretation and individual rights under the ECHR.  
I. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
We can best approach understanding Drittwirkung and competing hierarchical 
categories using the functionalist method of looking at practical causes and 
effects empirically and inductively. With this method we can now attempt to 
analyse the scope of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR. We proceed in both 
cases by analysing the relevant treaty’s terms and then looking at leading cases 
that attempt to interpret and apply the treaties. We conclude that opportunities 
do exist for the protection of human rights via tort law, even extraterritorially, 
within the ECHR. 
A. The Terms of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1. Article 1 ECHR 
Art. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 
Two notes are important here. First, the convention on its own terms expressly 
extends its protections to “everyone” “subject to the jurisdiction” of the con-
tracting state174 without regard to nationality.175 This protection goes beyond 
                                                 
174 Karl Josef Partsch, Die Rechte und Freiheiten der europäischen Menschenrechtskon-
vention, Berlin 1966: Duncker & Humblot (hereafter Partsch), p. 60. 
175 “[I]n becoming a Party to the Convention a state undertakes to secure Convention 
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the ordinary duty of states imposed by international law to respect the rights of 
foreign citizens.176 The ECHR is not linked to citizenship for such would not 
serve the goals of the convention.177 Furthermore, individuals may either be 
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting state (in personam ju-
risdiction) or be subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting state by reason of 
personal property (in rem jurisdiction).178 Merely having property subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court can subject the individual to its jurisdiction. This 
implies that the convention protects the fundamental rights of individuals 
rather than the interests of contracting states, as case law shows.179 For exam-
ple, in Ireland v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights stated that: “Unlike 
international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than 
mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and 
above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, 
in the words of the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.”180 
Similar reasoning also applies to the genocide convention.181  
Though individuals may bring claims against other states, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) do not have standing to bring cases before the 
ECHR.182 The Strasbourg Court has held that: 
“it is clear ... that it is not the applicant Union, as such, which is the victim of 
the alleged infringement of the right guaranteed by article 14 of the Conven-
tion. It is not the association itself, in fact which could be compelled to com-
pulsory labour, but each of its members as individuals. It follows that, as re-
gards the alleged violation of Article 4, the applicant Union cannot claim to be 
the victim of a violation of the Convention.”183 
                                                                                                                                                      
rights and freedoms ‘not only to its own nationals and those of other High Contracting 
Parties but also to nationals of States not parties to the Convention and to stateless 
persons’.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights 
Treaties in the Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 
European Journal of International Law 529, 548 (2003) (quoting Austria v. Italy, 4 YB 
ECHR (1961), 138-140) (hereafter Orakhelashvili). 
176 Partsch, at 60. 
177 Id. 
178 Id., at 60-61. 
179 Orakhelashvili, at 529, citing Austria v. Italy, 4 YB ECHR (1961), 140.  
180 Id., citing Ireland v. UK, 58 ILR (1980) 188, at 291. 
181 Advisory Opinion on Reservations, ICJ Reports (1951) at 23. 
182 Marek Antoni Nowicki, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) before the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, in: Michele de Salvia/Mark E. Villiger (eds.), The 
Birth of European Human Rights Law, Baden-Baden 1998: Nomos, p. 82, citing Un-
ion of Air Hostesses und Attendants und Others v. Greece. 
183 Union of Air Hostesses und Attendants und Others v. Greece. See also, e.g., Applica-
tions Nos. 9900/82, Dec. 4.5.83, D.R. 32, p. 261; 9939/82. Dec. 4.7.83, D.R 34, p. 
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NGOs often play a key “watchdog” role in protection of human rights – but 
they cannot play this role under the terms of the ECHR as it is today. 
What of the “territoriality” of the conventions rights? The extension of the 
protections of the convention to citizen and non-citizen alike is very favourable 
to human rights’ protection of non-citizens, since a general climate of respect 
for the law is necessary for the protection of human rights. However, the limi-
tation of those rights to those places “subject to the jurisdiction” of a contract-
ing party is unfavourable to human rights protection globally. The conven-
tion’s protections do not travel with the citizen of a contracting party when 
they leave the jurisdiction of a contracting state. Historically, however, until 
the industrial revolution law was essentially personal: thus Roman law would 
apply to Romans outside of the territory of the Empire. In the medieval era 
Christians, Moslems and Jews had different rights in one country. We can also 
still see vestiges of law based on the person and not territory. These are most 
evident in religious law, which in some states (notably those influenced by Is-
lamic religion) is the governing positive law of family relations including the 
law of successions. The idea that the law follows the person is also reflected in 
the law of nationality of those states which, like Germany, determine national-
ity by descent according to the rule of ius sanguine. Historically this differen-
tial personalized treatment explained, for example, why Jewish persons could 
become moneylenders though that was forbidden to Christians. Unfortunately 
the human rights protections of the convention are not extended like the laws 
of the Roman Empire to the person of the citizens of a contracting state. Under 
Article 1, once a person is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the contract-
ing parties they no longer enjoy the legal protection of the convention. 
On the other hand, the convention does protect the rights not only of citi-
zens but also of all persons within the jurisdiction of a contracting party. Even 
transient persons enjoy the human rights protection of the convention. This is a 
very generous fact for that is not at all the case of the constitutional protections 
of the U.S. which are increasingly seen as not having application or having 
only reduced application to non-citizens. 
As we will see in the cases of Al-Adsani, Bankovic, and Loizidou, the prin-
cipal issue in any litigation for extra-territorial effect of the convention is sim-
ply whether the convention even applies at all. The non-applicability of the 
convention to extra-territorial conduct – even where such conduct is a violation 
of customary international law! – is a serious limitation of the convention. We 
now will look at the specific protections of the convention to see whether they 
can be the basis for individual claims in tort. 
                                                                                                                                                      
213; ll553/85 and ll658/85 (joined), Dec. 9.3.87, D.R. 5l, p. 136. 
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2. Article 5 – Right to Liberty and Security 
Art. 5 states:  
“(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law. 
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention 
of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensa-
tion.” 
Art. 5 (5) is intended to assure the enforcement of the familiar rights of crimi-
nal procedure protected under Art. 5 (1) – 5 (4) before national courts. 
Art. 5 (5) thus serves a similar function with Art. 13 (infra).184 The right to 
compensation for wrongful arrest is, however, subject to ordinary jurisdictional 
rules (a claimant must appear before the proper court) and must have ex-
hausted his local remedies.185 Art. 5 (5) essentially creates a private cause of 
action in tort to remedy abuse of human rights by the government. Thus, the 
ECHR in fact does guarantee its protections in part through tort. 
3. Article 3 – Freedom from Torture 
Art. 3 states clearly and succinctly in its entirety: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
Art. 3 requires that remedies for torture must be given to ‘everyone’, not only 
victims whose torture involves the state accused of not providing the necessary 
remedy. On this basis one can argue for an extensive reading of Article 3, par-
ticularly since torture is a violation of jus cogens, universally condemned, and 
liable to universal jurisdiction. One scholar thus argues that “Article 1 extends 
to everyone who is under the jurisdiction of the state when claiming that their 
rights guaranteed by the Convention, such as freedom from torture, have been 
violated, and it is not necessarily limited to situations where a victim is actu-
ally tortured within the jurisdiction of that state.”186 The extradition or forced 
repatriation187 of a person from a state party to the ECHR to a state where that 
                                                 
184 A. H. Robertson J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe, Manchester University 
Press: Manchester and New York (1993) p. 83. 
185 Wemhoff v. the Federal Republic of Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A, 
No. 7. 
186 Orakhelashvili, at 551. 
187 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, Oxford 1993: Clarendon, pp. 
189-190 (hereafter Clapham). 
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person will likely be tortured or subject to an inhuman punishment is a viola-
tion of Article 3.188 The responsibility of a state party can even be invoked for 
acts by terrorists who are not state sponsored or even for acts of non-
contracting States.189 
4. Article 6 – Right to a Fair Trial 
Art. 6 essentially guaranties usual rights of the accused to a fair and speedy 
trial seen in all developed countries before a neutral judge. However, Art. 6 of 
the ECHR does not contain any express provision as to what form of court 
proceeding is required. Thus, for example one of the parties to a proceeding 
does not necessarily have the right to be a witness in his cause.190 However, 
unlike Art. 13, Art. 6 creates immediately enforceable rights in all persons sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of a state party.191 Thus, Art. 6 can be invoked before 
national courts where the convention has internal effect within the domestic 
legal order.192  
5. Article 13 – Right to an Effective Remedy 
Art. 13 of the ECHR states: 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are vio-
lated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstand-
ing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official ca-
pacity.” 
It can only be invoked in connection with some other right guaranteed under 
the ECHR.193 What is meant by “effective remedy”? The ECHR has held that 
“an effective remedy under Article 13 must mean a remedy that is as effective 
                                                 
188 Partsch, at 109. 
189 Id., at189; see, e.g., Mrs. W. v. Ireland, Applic. 9360/81, 32 D. & R. 190 para. 14. 
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191 P. van Dijk, C.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice Of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, Deventer/Boston 1990: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, p. 525, citing 
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as it can be, having regard to the restricted scope for recourse inherent in any 
system for the protection of national security.”194  
As was already mentioned, Article 13 does not provide a cause of action in 
its own terms but rather only in combination with some other article of the 
convention. However, once another right is invoked, if that right can be heard 
before a national court in a domestic proceeding, Art. 13 would allow a rem-
edy against persons – even against persons acting in their official capacity!195 
One could argue, probably unsuccessfully, that Art. 13 implies a waiver of 
immunity of state officials. A criminal complaint linked to a claim for com-
pensation in tort raises the issue of whether Art. 13 and Art. 6 para 1 can be 
invoked as a defence which does seem to be the case.196 
All these possible claims raise the question whether and when the ECHR 
has “direct effect”. The question for reasons already extensively discussed in 
the preceding chapter is actually ill put. The answer to this question will show 
why. Let us look at the legal facts: It is true that only a state party may be sued 
under the ECHR. Strictly speaking the ECHR has no direct third party ef-
fect.197 However, as expressly noted by the Strasbourg court, the convention is 
relevant “even in the sphere of relations between individuals”.198 This rele-
vance arises through application of the ECHR within the domestic legal order 
of the contracting states by laws such as Britain’s Human Rights Act. Further, 
in monist states such as France where treaty law is part of the domestic legal 
order the ECHR does have direct effect.199 So while it is possible to pose ques-
tions about “Drittwirkung” and/or “direct effect” these abstract analytical tools 
can really only yield confusing answers. However, by asking more specific 
concrete questions we can reach satisfactory answers obviating the need for 
confused terminological hair-splitting. 
As we can see, on its own terms, there are a few legal arguments under the 
ECHR that could be made for victims of torts in violation of human rights, 
most significantly perhaps Art. 5 (5) of the ECHR. How do these rights work 
out in the practice? To answer that question we look at case law. 
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B. Cases Litigated under the Convention 
With a basic understanding of the texts which may be the basis for protection 
of human rights in tort we can now see how the ECHR applies those texts and 
whether this application ever results in extra-territorial effect of the ECHR. 
Sadly the results are disappointing. In just about all cases the ECHR is inter-
preted conservatively such and is not applied outside the territory of the con-
tracting parties. 
1. Bankovic 
In Bankovic, survivors and relatives of civilian victims killed by a NATO air-
bombardment of the Belgrade Radio-Television station complained of viola-
tions of Article 2 (right to life), Article 10 (freedom of information) and Article 
13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. The claims were determined as inadmissible as the place bombarded 
was not within the Article 1 jurisdiction of the Convention.200  
The court reasoned that, wherever decided, the act was performed outside 
the jurisdiction of the state-parties.201 The court, bound by the Vienna Conven-
tion on treaties,202 applied an “ordinary meaning”203 test to the phrase “within 
their jurisdiction in context of the object and purpose of the convention and 
subsequent practice.204 The court quickly concluded that as to the ordinary 
meaning of “jurisdiction” in Article 1 of the ECHR, state jurisdictional compe-
tence is primarily territorial and that exceptions thereto are defined and limited 
by the territorial rights of other states.205 The court found that state practice206 
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and the travaux préparatoires of the convention207 supported this view. 
Though the court acknowledges that the ECHR is a “living instrument”208 it 
notes that the travaux préparatoires clearly indicate the intent of the contract-
ing state parties.209 
This decision has been sharply criticized. Orakhelashvili notes that the 
court in Bankovic was at the margin of its mandate and that a ruling would re-
quire the court to adjudicate and overrule legal principles and considerations 
external to the Convention.210 Nonetheless he criticizes the decision because 
the court did not decide the case for those reasons but rather attempted to jus-
tify its decision within the terms of the convention itself,211 but ignored the 
duty of the court “to resolve any doubts in the light of the object and purpose 
of the treaty”.212 Orakhelashvili goes on to say that: “The general impression 
...from Bankovic and Al-Adsani is that the European Court feels free to pick 
and choose between different methods of interpretation as if there were no or-
der or hierarchy between these methods.”213 
Orakhelashvili is correct. There is even a term for this type of decision 
making: it is called “legal realism”. To prove his charge, Orakhelashvili notes 
that: “...specific interpretive methods were misapplied... the Court has practi-
cally failed in the two cases to accord due importance to the nature of the 
European Convention as an instrument of public order establishing obligations 
of an objective nature, which go beyond the reciprocal commitments of indi-
vidual contracting states. Furthermore, the Court also neglected the question of 
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213 Id., at 537. 
 55
how certain provisions of the Convention are mirrored in general international 
law. Finally, the Court’s line of reasoning in both cases lacked the requisite 
degree of coherence when dealing with the previous jurisprudence of the Con-
vention organs.”214 
In sum, the court’s decision if unprincipled was also inept. A more coherent 
and defensible decision could have been reached either on the basis of state 
immunity or on the international law concerns expressed by Orakhelashvili. 
We can see the flaw in the courts’ reasoning this way: suppose that a band of 
robbers and murders decided in Italy to conspire to kill a Serbian, then went to 
Serbia and killed the person, and returned to Italy to enjoy their plunder. 
Would the victim and survivors then be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
ECHR for their criminal conspiracy? Certainly. Further, the NATO aircraft, as 
aspects of the state, are by their very nature an exercise of jurisdiction, namely 
jurisdiction to enforce. Thus the convention should apply. The reasoning of the 
court in Bankovic is flawed. 
2. Al-Adsani 
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Al-Adsani 
v. United Kingdom215 is factually similar to Saudi Arabia v. Nelson216. Al-
Adsani, a British pilot in the Kuwaiti air force, was tortured by the Kuwaiti 
government, apparently for distributing salacious tapes of an important 
sheikh.217 The plaintiff was not only beaten and threatened but was severely 
burned, ultimately requiring medical treatment in Britain.218 The plaintiff 
based his claims on Art. 3 (freedom from torture) and Art. 6 (the right of ac-
cess to a court) of the ECHR. Art. 3 was determined to be inapplicable outside 
the jurisdiction of the contracting states.219 Art. 6 was also complied with by 
the contracting state because of the immunity of foreign states. Al-Adsani was 
a case of the immunity of a state (as opposed to an individual)220 for officially 
sanctioned torture.221 Again, state immunity shows itself to be a key problem 
in guaranteeing human rights. Citing Nelson222 and Amerada Hess223 (among 
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others) the ECHR found Kuwait to be immune.224 Like the case of Sampson v. 
F.R.G.,225 Al-Adsani relies on the tenuous distinction that while states may not 
violate their jus cogens obligations, those obligations do not require states to 
create remedies for their breach by other states.226 Thus a state can grant an-
other state immunity for violation of jus cogens. The only other reading of that 
case would be that torture is not in fact a norm erga omnes227 or jus cogens228 
which, given the convention against torture and state practice, is not the case. 
Further, Al-Adsani cannot be read as carving out a “de minimis” defence to tor-
ture: The plaintiff was severely burned (unlike Nelson who suffered no perma-
nent physical injury). This decision, like the decision in Belgium v. Congo, 
effectively denudes jus cogens and if applied to the war crimes of the last 
world war would have exonerated many of those convicted. 
However, Al-Adsani does contain one hidden gem for those who wish to 
defend human rights. Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait229 clearly states that for 
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explains why well every state has a remedy against violation of a norm erga omnes, 
no state must grant a remedy for a violation of jus cogens. Erga omnes norms are 
owed by states to the entire international community. Id. For an excellent discussion 
of jus cogens vs. erga omnes in the international criminal context see, Cherif Bas-
siouni, International Crimes, Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, SOS-Attentats, 
Conference Proceedings, 265-278 (2002) available at:   
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp59dFall1996p63.htm. 
59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63 (Autumn 1996). 
229 107 I.L.R. 536, 540 (Eng. C.A. 1996): “In international law, torture is a violation of a 
fundamental human right, it is a crime and a tort for which the victim should be com-
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every crime there is a corresponding intentional tort in international law as 
well as domestically. Thus Al-Adsani leaves open two possibilities for plain-
tiffs. One is to argue from customary law that the common law, as French law, 
directly incorporates customary international law as part of the common 
law/droit commun; that for every common law crime there is a corresponding 
tort; and thus, plaintiffs can sue under the ordinary tort regime while enjoying 
the jurisdictional benefits of universal jurisdiction as to violations of jus co-
gens. This does not, however, remove the defences of the state to immunity. 
But, logically, state immunity cannot be asserted in violation of jus cogens, 
because jus cogens norms are by definition non-derogable. Further, even if 
immunity for violations of jus cogens were not a logical impossibility, the im-
munity of the state must be distinguished from the immunity of the state’s 
agent. By suing not the state but its agent the issue of the state’s immunity is 
obviated. Then only the personal immunity of the defendant will be at issue. 
While ranking ministers and heads of state, according to the ICJ, do enjoy per-
sonal immunity for official acts during their term of office, this does not mean 
that lower ranking state officials have personal immunity. Further, personal 
immunities are limited to official acts after expiration of the officials’ term of 
office.  
3. Brumarescu and Loizidou: Extraterritoriality and Expropriation 
Not all cases that seek to apply the ECHR outside the territory of the EU fail. 
In two cases of expropriation of land outside the EU but within the jurisdiction 
of contracting states, jurisdiction was found. The cases of Loizidu v. Turkey230 
and Brumarescu v. Romania,231 although judged by the European Court of 
Human Rights and thus possibly valid only in Europe, may be evidence of a 
right to compensation or restitution for nationalization's under international 
law.232 
Though Romania is not a member of the EU it, like Turkey, is a signatory 
to the ECHR. Thus the application of the ECHR was not really problematic. 
However, as it acts as a companion case to the more controversial case of Lo-
izidou v. Turkey we will look at it briefly. In Brumarescu, the Brumarescu’s 
house was nationalized by the Romanian government in 1950.233 That nation-
                                                                                                                                                      
pensated.” 
230 Loizidu v. Turkey, ECHR 28/7/1998. 
231 Brumarescu v. Romania, ECHR, 28/10/1999. 
232 But see: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398. 
233 Brumarescu v. Romania, 28 October 1999, ECHR Application no. 28342/95 (Judg-
ment: Merits) para. 12, available at:   
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alization was wrongful in the sense that by Romanian domestic law the Bru-
marescus should have been exempted from nationalization.234 The house was 
later sold in 1974 by the state to a third party. The house then passed by inheri-
tance to the Mirescus. The European Court recognized the right of the Bru-
marescus to compensation.235  
Loizidou v. Turkey more clearly raised the issue of what is meant by juris-
diction in Article 1 of the ECHR. Loizidu owned land on Cyprus – which was, 
however, seized when the Turkish government invaded and occupied northern 
Cyprus.236 Turkey then created a puppet government which, however, has 
been recognized de jure by no state other than Turkey. The court had no prob-
lem finding that northern Cyprus was subject to the jurisdiction of Turkey be-
cause of the Turkish military presence. This opens up the possibility of arguing 
that NATO occupied areas of Yugoslavia were subject to the jurisdiction of 
one or several of the state parties to the ECHR or its rarely invoked American 
counterpart. 
Like Brumarescu, Loizidu v. Turkey also recognized a right to compensa-
tion for the seizure of the plaintiff’s land.237 Brumarescu could, however, be 
limited by the fact that the nationalization was not in the public interest but 
rather was in the interest of only private persons.238 Similarly Loizidou could 
be limited by the fact that Turkey had no legal right to invade Cyprus, and 
thereby violated the Charter of the United Nations.239 In fact, the emerging 
norm against nationalization is one more evidence of the limitation of state 
sovereignty. The historic definition of a state’s sovereignty was ultimate and 
absolute authority over all persons and objects within its territory. This ulti-
mate and absolute power is increasingly relativized in the contemporary inter-
national system. 
                                                                                                                                                      
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D
3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=32051&sessionId=709797&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true. 
234 Id., at para. 15. 
235 Id., at para. 22.  
236 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Publications ECHR, Se-
ries A no. 310, para. 11. 
237 Id., at para. 26-27 (ECHR 1998). 
238 Brumarescu v. Romania (Application no. 28342/95), para. 13 (ECHR, 28 October 1999). 
239 Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50) (40/1993/435/514) para. 13 (ECHR, 28 July 1998). 
 59
4. Tugar v. Italy240 
In Tugar v. Italy an Iraqi mine clearer operating in Iraq detonated a mine los-
ing one leg as a result. The mines were sold by Italy. At the time Italy had no 
export licensing requirements on mines. It later enacted one but only after the 
sale of the mine in question. Tugar’s complaint was based on Art. 2 and 
Art. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. His claim was deter-
mined to be inadmissible, however, due to Art. 1 which applies the convention 
to those acts “within the jurisdiction” of the contracting state parties. While the 
manufacture and even sale of the mines occurred in Italy, they were sent out-
side the territory of a state party to the convention and further ultimately de-
ployed not by a contracting party but by Iraq. Essentially, Tugar’s claim was 
that Italy negligently failed to prevent sale of arms to an outlaw state or gov-
ernment. Of course, the ECHR can apply outside the territory of the Contract-
ing Parties: 
“A measure of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoy-
ment of a Convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not 
too remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant 
Convention guarantee.”241  
A point the court conceded to Tugar. However, Tugar’s case was distinguished 
from the Soering decision242, on the argument that the decision to extradite is 
an act of ”jurisdiction”243 and that, in contrast, the injury to Tugar: 
“can not be seen as a direct consequence of the failure of the Italian authorities 
to legislate on arms transfers. There is no immediate relationship between the 
mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of weapons and the possible ‘in-
discriminate’ use thereof in a third country, the latter's action constituting the 
direct and decisive cause of the accident which the applicant suffered.” 244 
This distinction is of course very similar to that made in the common law of 
torts between cause in fact and proximate cause: in Tugar’s case, while there 
would be causation in fact, there would not be proximate causation.  
The logic of the decision in Tugar does not seem flawed but the outcome is 
                                                 
240 Tugar v. Italy, Application No. 22869/93 (ECHR 18 October 1995) available at : 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D
3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=2341&sessionId=710132&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true. 
241 Soering, ECHR, 7 July 1989, Publications ECHR, Series A no. 161, p. 33, para 85. 
242 Id. 
243 Then why isn’t the decision in Bankovic to send bombing aircraft also an act of juris-
diction? 
244 Tugar v. Italy, Application No. 22869/93 (ECHR 18 October 1995). 
 60
very dissatisfying. The struggle to suppress anti-personnel mines is very im-
portant since such mines kill long after the conflict that led to their deployment 
and the victims are often children. Further, Tugar was working for an NGO 
which offered mine clearing operations as a sub-contractor. The decision does 
not say whether there was a contract and if so with which state. Suppose Tugar 
had been employed as a directly or indirectly by an ECHR signatory. Suppose 
further, that an ECHR signatory was exercising actual control over the area 
that Tugar was working in. Those presuppositions would be good arguments 
for application of the ECHR to his case. 
Conclusion 
Our study has revealed that the laws of the Member States of the European Un-
ion are generally the most successful line of attack on extra-territorial human 
rights violations. Secondarily, the ECHR may be able to be used to remedy 
human rights violations. We have seen that the principle remedy in European 
law is criminal prosecution, but that tort law can and does play a supplemen-
tary and/or secondary role as a legal remedy to violations of human rights out-
side the territory of the Member States. Our study has also revealed that the 
national laws both of the EU Member States and the United State could, con-
sistent with international law, go further than they do in protecting human 
rights outside of Europe.  
Protections at the supra-national are possible before the European Court of 
Human Rights. Such protections, however, are generally limited in their effect 
to Europe. Whether before courts of the Member States or before the European 
Court of Human Rights, creative lawyering could extend human rights protec-
tion to cases within the terms of existing treaties. 
Throughout this study we have seen that the principle limitation on extra-
territorial defence of human rights is immunity and jurisdiction. Both these ob-
stacles, while serious, are not insurmountable. It seems relatively clear that the 
United States has gone further in the protection of human rights through pri-
vate law just as it is equally clear that Europe has much more vigorously used 
criminal law to prosecute such offences. However, these offences are so hei-
nous that ideally Europe and the United States will learn from each other and 
extend the protection of human rights. Just as Europe would do well to con-
sider an Alien Tort Statute, so would the United States do well to consider the 
action civile. These are just the two most obvious examples. This work has 
tried to highlight other areas where good faith application of the law as it is can 
be used to extend the protection of human rights to all persons in the world. 
Hopefully it will contribute to that task. 
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